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The Solicitors' Journal.

LONDON, JANUARY 20, 1877.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE COURSE we indicated some time ago has been taken, and Mr. Tooth either is, or is about to be, in the words of the writ, "attached by his body until he shall have made satisfaction for his contempt." The Act of George III. provides that, in all causes cognizable in the ecclesiastical courts, when a person fails to obey the lawful orders of the court "it shall be lawful for the judge whose orders have not been obeyed to pronounce such person contumacious and in contempt, and within ten days to signify the same" to the Sovereign in chancery in a form scheduled to the Act, "and thereupon," proceeds the Act, "a writ *de contumace capiendo* shall issue from the Court of Chancery" in a form to the Act annexed. For the purpose of executing the writ the provisions of 5 Eliz. c. 23, relating to the writ *de excommunicato capiendo*, are incorporated. From this ancient statute it appears that the "writte shall be made to conteyn at the least twenty days between the teste and the returne thereof, and after the writte shall be made and sealed, then the said writt shalbee foorthewth brought into the said Courte of the Kinges Benche, and there in the presence of the justices shall be opened and delyvered of recorde to the sheriff or other officer to whom the serving and executyon thereof shall apperteyne." If it appear to the justices that the writ is not returned, the justices "shall and may assesse such amerciament upon the sherif or other officer in whom suche defalte shall appear, as to the discretyon of the sayd justices shalbee thought meete and convenient." The Act of George III. provides that on the "due submission" of the party who has committed the contempt, the judge of the ecclesiastical court shall pronounce the party absolved from the contempt, and shall make an order on the officer in whose custody he shall be for discharging such party out of custody, and the officer shall, on the order being shown to him, and upon the discharge of costs incurred by reason of such custody and contempt, forthwith discharge the party. Mr. Tooth's friends have declared for him that he will not "submit himself," and Archdeacon Denison stated on Tuesday that "Mr. Tooth is looking forward to dwelling in a prison during the remainder of his life," and, the archdeacon is reported to have added, "if I know the man, I must say nothing in the world will ever take him out of it." This is, perhaps, a little rash, for 3 & 4 Vict. c. 93, which was passed because Mr. Thorogood went to prison rather than pay 5s. 6d. for church rates, expressly enables the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, or the judge of any ecclesiastical court, if it shall seem meet to the said committee or judge, and with the consent of the other parties to the suit, to make an order upon the gaoler in whose custody the party is under any writ *de contumace capiendo*, issued in consequence of proceedings before the court, for discharging such party out of custody.

IF OPINION "IN THE NARROW SPHERE OF LONDON" runs, as Mr. Daniel says it does, "in certain small grooves and circles," speeches in the country are also a little apt to keep in one track. When Mr. Daniel addresses a public meeting we know pretty well beforehand the burden of his message. The county courts should be the universal courts of first instance; people in London (which, "notwithstanding its numbers, is really a little place") cannot understand how free from local influences and prepossessions a county court judge can be, or how earnestly the mercantile public desire a local court of first instance, with an easy appeal from the provincial to what Mr. Daniel is still kind enough to call the superior courts. We print in another column one of these utterances, and, with much respect for Mr. Daniel, we should like to know, once for all, on what he bases his idea that the commercial public are likely to be better satisfied with his scheme than with the present arrangements. On the delays of the Superior Courts? Of course, no mercantile man likes the delays which have occurred in these courts; but to allege these delays, and to suggest that no remedy for them exists but the extension of the jurisdiction of the county courts, at the very time when a vigorous effort is being put in operation to remove them in several divisions of the High Court, at least, is surely most inopportune. Mr. Daniel might wait until the single-judge system has had a trial before he assumes the fulfilment of his dolorous predictions as to the Judicature Acts. The real question is, whether the public would like any better the rough and summary decision of the county court, with the certainty of an appeal? Mr. Daniel omits to remind his audiences that if parties to disputes are disgusted with the superior courts, there is nothing to prevent them from going to the county court. By consent, these courts have jurisdiction to any amount, yet in all the county courts in 1874 there were exactly twenty-two plaints above £50 entered by agreement. Does this argue any great appreciation of the advantages offered by these courts? The fact is, we believe, mercantile men do not want a decision which, though speedy enough, would be followed by an appeal. What they want is a decision of a court of first instance of sufficient authority to be likely to settle the matter. It would be absurd, we humbly submit, to set the same judicial machinery to work to collect small debts and to decide important or complicated questions; hence we must have two classes of judges of first instance. This truth seems at last to be recognized even by county court judges, for the latest of the little schemes which are periodically laid before the public by those gentlemen provides that "judges of higher standing than ordinary county court judges" should be placed in certain centres, who should have unlimited jurisdiction, with power of removal of cases. This comes very near to the scheme which we venture to predict will ultimately come into operation—viz., regular and frequent sittings of the judges of the High Court in the great centres of population.

IN ANOTHER COLUMN we publish some extracts from a letter which lately appeared in a local newspaper on the question of the Full Court of Divorce. Our readers will not require to be reminded that the decision referred to by our contemporary is *Westhead* v. *Westhead* (25 W. R. 35), in which the Court of Appeal held, on what appear to us to be very inconclusive grounds, that the Full Court of Divorce was still a subsisting court, different at once from the old Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, and from the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, and that its jurisdiction had not been transferred to themselves. We are quite unable to follow the reasoning by which their lordships arrived at this conclusion, and think that it would not be difficult to show, if necessary, (1) that the "Full

Court of Divorce" was not a different court from "her Majesty's Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes," but the same; (2) that its jurisdiction was transferred by the Judicature Act, 1873, to the Supreme Court of Judicature; and (3) that the combined effect of the three Judicature Acts is to vest that jurisdiction, so far as it is original in the Probate, &c., Division, and so far as it is appellate in the Court of Appeal. That, however, is not the point in hand; it is not to be anticipated that the Court of Appeal will ever be called upon to re-consider its opinion, or that it would alter it if it were; but it is, we think, desirable to call the attention of the profession, and through them of the Legislature, to the anomalous condition of this court, which, it would appear, still exists as a court of appeal in those cases (such as new trial orders and decrees of judicial separation) where its orders used to be final, though it is admitted that in those cases (such as decrees for divorce) where a further appeal lay (and lies) to the House of Lords, all its jurisdiction has been transferred to the Court of Appeal. That the constitution of the court itself is of an objectionable character (being virtually an appeal "from Philip to Philip") is a further reason, if one were needed, why the Legislature should at once interfere to remedy what is obviously either an unintentional slip in the wording of the Acts or a disfiguring blot on the face of the late reforms.

THE QUESTION proposed by "A Country Commissioner"—whether country commissioners to administer oaths can administer them in London or elsewhere outside the limits of the district formerly assigned to them—may still be regarded as a moot question, the point involved not having yet been judicially decided. But prevalent practice justifies the conclusion that "A Country Commissioner" may administer an oath in London as well as in the country in any proceeding pending in the Supreme Court, and notwithstanding his certificate empowering him to practise *as a solicitor* is for the country only. The object of sections 77 and 82 of the Judicature Act, 1873, was to constitute "every person" who, on the 1st of November, 1875, held any commission to administer oaths from any of the courts which, by that Act, were merged in the Supreme Court, a commissioner of that court, and to authorize him, as such, to administer oaths "in all causes and matters whatever which may from time to time be depending in the High Court or in the Court of Appeal"—thus placing "every" commissioner of the Supreme Court in the same relation to the Supreme Court, and to the proceedings pending therein, with powers co-equal and co-extensive. In saying that "prevalent practice" justifies the conclusion above stated, we allude to the fact that every commissioner of the Supreme Court, whether practising as a solicitor in London or in the country, is now designated alike, and that, in filing and in using affidavits in proceedings pending in the court, a question is never even suggested, much less raised, as to whether the commissioner administering the oath to any such affidavit exercised his power within the limits of any particular district.

On Saturday it was announced in the Queen's Bench Division that, in consequence of the inability to find any court for the discharge of business other than the courts hitherto in use by the division, the judges found to their regret that it would be utterly impossible to comply with the spirit of the new Act, that one judge only should sit to hear the special paper on Tuesday next, except where two judges are desired by the parties, and, at the same time, to find occupation for all the judges. Their lordships, therefore, thought that, in these unfortunate circumstances, the only arrangement open to them until accommodation is provided is that two judges should sit *in Banco* instead of one only.

DEBENTURES AND THE MORTMAIN ACT.

I.

Two recent cases have revived the question whether debentures are within the 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, commonly called the Mortmain Act. In *Holdsworth* v. *Davenport* (25 W. R. 20, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 185) Vice-Chancellor Malins held that debentures of a water works company in the form prescribed by the Companies Clauses Act—which, it will be remembered, is an assignment by the company to the person who has lent the money, his executors, administrators, and assigns, of the undertaking, and all the tolls and sums of money arising by virtue of the Act, and all the estate, right, title, and interest of the company, to hold until the sum lent should be repaid with interest—were within the Act. In *Chandler* v. *Howell* (25 W. R. 55), on the other hand, Vice-Chancellor Hall held that debentures issued by improvement commissioners authorized by a private Act of Parliament to purchase land and buildings and to construct and carry on gas works and water works, secured upon the "works, rents, and rates authorized to be erected, reserved, made, and collected," were within the Act.

It is necessary to point out, in the first place, that the Mortmain Act provides a double bar against gifts to charitable uses of property savouring of real estate. It restricts gifts, not only (1) of an estate or interest in lands or hereditaments corporeal or incorporeal, but also (2) of a charge or incumbrance affecting the same. It is important to bear this in mind when we come to consider the application of the Act to shares in, and debentures of, companies holding land. Shares in such companies are obviously only struck at by the first branch of the restriction; and as to them the test has been clearly settled. It is—can the shares in any event result to the shareholder as land? In *Sparling* v. *Parker* (9 Beav. 450) Lord Langdale held that shares in companies possessing real estate for the purposes of their undertaking are not within the Mortmain Act, on the ground that the shareholder has no interest in or separate right to the land, or any part of it. So long as the company continues, the share is transferable only for money; if it be dissolved, the whole property is sold, the concern wound up, and the shareholder obtains only his share of the surplus, if any, which remains after satisfying all demands on the joint concern. The rule laid down in this case was affirmed in *Myers* v. *Perigal* (on appeal 2 D. G. M. & G. 599) and in *Edwards* v. *Hall* (6 D. G. M. & G. 74).

But in the case of debentures of a company holding land it is not sufficient to say that they are not "an interest in land" within the statute. The further question arises—Are they a charge or incumbrance affecting land or other hereditaments? In order fully to understand the rules which have been laid down on this subject it is necessary to go back to the case of *Knapp* v. *Williams* (4 Ves. 430, note). The question was whether a mortgage of turnpike tolls was within the Act. It seems that it had been previously held by Sir W. Grant, in a case relating to Serjeant Aspinall's will, that a mortgage of turnpike tolls, *including the toll houses and gates*, was within the Act, on the ground that the mortgagee might bring ejectment for the houses, and so the mortgage was directly a "charge or incumbrance on land" within the words of the statute. In *Knapp* v. *Williams*, the mortgage of the tolls did not include the toll houses or gates, and Lord Eldon admitted that the case was "not at all within the mischief" of the Act; but he added, "The consequences would open a much larger field for charitable donations"; and in accordance with the ideas then prevalent as to the policy of the law on this subject, he set himself to discover some mode in which this field might be narrowed. He seems to have found it in the circumstance that the mortgagee of tolls had the right to have a receiver appointed, and he held that the mort-

gage was within the statute. The test thus laid down does not appear to have been again applied until 1849, when, in *Myers* v. *Perigal* (16 Sim. 533), Shadwell, V.C., had to decide the question whether a debenture of a railway company assigning the "undertaking and all and singular the rates, tolls, and profits arising by virtue of the said Act" was a charge on land within the Act of George II. The Vice-Chancellor said that the debenture amounted to nothing more than a promise to pay money borrowed on the credit of the undertaking, and did not give the holder whose interest was in arrear the right to apply to justices under 10 Geo. 4, c. 62, to appoint a receiver of the rates, and he accordingly held that the debentures were not within the statute. A few years afterwards the test to be applied was explained by Wood, V.C., in *In re Langham's Trusts* (10 Hare, 446), where, in holding a mortgage of a canal company, which assigned the tolls, rates, and duties vested in the company, and also the "navigation, undertaking, and premises and all the estate of the company," to be within the statute, he said, "In certain events the mortgagee would be entitled to have a receiver of the tolls appointed, and a party who personally, or through the hands of a receiver, might take the tolls, had acquired a direct interest in land [*qy.* charge or incumbrance affecting land ?] within the meaning of the statute." And in *Ashton* v. *Lord Langdale* (4 D G. & Sm. 402) Knight Bruce, V.C., held that mortgages of the undertaking and tolls of a railway were a charge or incumbrance affecting lands or hereditaments within the statute; the foundation of this decision being that where bodies corporate or unincorporate, having the power to collect rates, tolls, or dues, payable out of, or in respect of, land, mortgage such rates, tolls, or dues, they pass all their interest, including their right of raising such rates, tolls, or dues (see *Thornton* v. *Kempson*, Kay, 592, 599), and the mortgage thus becomes a charge or incumbrance affecting lands. That is to say, if the debenture-holders can step into the shoes of the company, and have the tolls collected for them, the debentures are within the Act. Lord Langdale's decision in *Walker* v. *Milne* (11 Beav. 507), that bonds of a canal company secured on the rates were not within the Act, notwithstanding that under the Canal Act two justices might appoint a receiver of the rates, on the ground that the debentures were "given by the authority of the Act of Parliament, plainly *with a view to the concern continuing*, and not with a view of coming to a court of equity to have it broken up and possession taken by this court," was expressly disapproved of by Knight Bruce, V.C., in *Ashton* v. *Lord Langdale*.

TRIAL BY JURY IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION.

The question which has been so much discussed since the Judicature Act came into operation, viz., whether, when an action in the Chancery Division is ordered to be tried before a judge with a jury, the trial is to be had before that judge of the Chancery Division to whom the action is attached, has at last been decided, in a case of *Warner* v. *Murdock*, by the Court of Appeal, who have held that, on the fair construction of the Act and the rules, it is intended that all actions—whether belonging to the Chancery Division or to any of the common law divisions—should be set down for trial in the one general list of the locality (so to speak) to which they belong, *i.e.*, the assizes, or London or Middlesex, the place of trial being, as is provided by r. 1 of ord. 36, the county of Middlesex in all cases in which no place of trial is named in the statement of claim. The court based their judgment mainly on the generality of the language used in those sections of the Act of 1873 which deal with the sittings of the High Court for trial by jury (particularly sections 29, 30, and 37), as well as in many of the rules of ord. 36, especially r. 16, which says that "the list or lists of actions for trial at the sittings in London and Middlesex respectively shall be prepared, and the actions shall be allotted for trial, *without reference to the Division of the High Court to which such actions may be attached.*"

The chief arguments in support of the appellant's contention, that the Master of the Rolls ought to have ordered the action to be set down for trial before himself with a jury, were these:—First, that there is nothing in the Judicature Acts to put an end to any jurisdiction which was formerly possessed by the Court of Chancery, but, on the contrary, that jurisdiction is by the Act transferred to the Chancery Division of the High Court, and in that transferred jurisdiction was included the power which was given to the Court of Chancery, by Lord Cairns and Sir John Rolt's Acts, to try questions of fact itself with the aid of a jury. To this argument the answer, as given by James, L.J., was that the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery is transferred by section 16 of the Act of 1873, not to the Chancery Division of the High Court, but to the High Court. It is, therefore, not a question of jurisdiction, but merely a question of the convenience of administration, whether trials by jury of actions belonging to the Chancery Division shall take place before a judge of that division, or before a judge of one of the other divisions.

Another argument was that r. 1 of ord. 39 (and rr. 5 and 6 of December, 1876, which are now substituted for it) prescribe the mode in which applications are to be made for new trials, but only with regard to actions in the three common law divisions. This, it was said, leads to the inference that it was intended that trials by jury in actions in the Chancery Division should take place before the judges of that division. But the court replied that the omission to provide for the Chancery Division in that rule only showed an intention that applications for new trials in actions in that division should be made in the way in which they would have been made under the old practice, *i.e.*, either to the judge to whom the suit was allotted, or to the Court of Appeal.

A third argument was that if all actions, to whatever division they belong, are to be tried, if tried by jury, at the assizes, or at the London or Middlesex sittings, what becomes of the power certainly possessed, and frequently exercised, by the Probate Court and the Divorce Court to try questions of fact themselves with juries—a power, moreover, which the judges of the Probate Division have constantly assumed to exercise since the Judicature Acts came into operation? To this argument the court held that a sufficient answer is supplied by section 18 of the Act of 1875, which says that "all rules and orders of court in force at the time of the commencement of this Act in the Court of Probate, the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, and the Admiralty Court, . . . except so far as they are expressly varied by the first schedule hereto, or by rules of court made by Order in Council before the commencement of this Act, shall remain and be in force in the High Court of Justice" until altered or annulled by rules of court.

But, perhaps, the strongest argument to show that the framers of the rules, or, at any rate, the judges who have been engaged in framing modifications of the original rules, intended them to bear a different construction from that which has been adopted by the Court of Appeal, was derived from the new and remarkable r. 4 of December, 1876 (on which we have before commented), which provides that, "where in any action in the Chancery Division the action, or any question at issue in the action, is ordered to be tried before any commissioner or commissioners of assize, or *at the London or Middlesex sittings of any division other than the Chancery Division*, the order directing such trial shall state on its face the reason for which it is expedient that the action, question, or issue should be so tried, and *should not be tried in the Chancery Division.*" The words which we have placed in italics certainly appear at first sight to imply that there are London or Middlesex sittings of the Chancery

Division, just as of the other divisions, and that an action in the Chancery Division *can* (at any rate) be tried by a jury in that division. The answer to this argument or implication, as given by Bramwell, J.A., was twofold. First, that it cannot be assumed, when the London or Middlesex sittings of the Chancery Division are referred to in this rule, that jury sittings were intended, as the language is satisfied by there being, as there are, London or Middlesex sittings of that division for the trial of actions without juries; and, secondly, that the rule applies only to cases where actions, or questions or issues in actions, in the Chancery Division are *ordered* (as, for instance, under r. 29 of ord. 36) to be tried at the assizes, or at the London or Middlesex sittings of some other division, and not to a case where, as in *Warner* v. *Murdock*, the action would go, so to speak, of its own accord into the list of actions for trial (as the case might be) at the assizes or at the London or Middlesex sittings.

Now that this *quæstio vexata* has been fully discussed and solemnly decided, it may be assumed that no further difficulty will arise in carrying into effect the provisions of the Act and rules in this respect, and if, as was understood at one time, directions were given to the officers of the common law divisions not to enter any chancery actions in their lists for trial, it may be concluded that those directions have now been cancelled. Were it otherwise a state of things would arise in the administration of justice which we will not contemplate as possible.

THE CHANCERY STAFF.

In view of the probable introduction of a Bill for the appointment of an additional judge in the Chancery Division of the High Court, it may not be uninteresting to recall to the recollection of our readers an outline of the steps which have from time to time been taken to provide for the despatch of Chancery business. The first source to which the Chancellor looked for assistance was his body of clerks or assistants, who were twelve in number, and who obtained in the reign of Edward III. the title of masters in chancery. The head of this body was styled the "clerk," or "custos" (he being at a very early date intrusted with the custody of the records of the court), and subsequently the "Master of the Rolls." The process by which the Master of the Rolls obtained judicial authority has been the subject of much discussion, but it seems to be agreed that he exercised some jurisdiction as early as the reign of Edward I. At a later period he was in the habit of sitting jointly with others of the judges. Bills were first addressed to him for relief in the time of Henry VI. Under Henry VIII. the Master of the Rolls was sometimes spoken of as a "Vice-Chancellor," and under Elizabeth he is described as "Assistant to the Chancellor." The special commissions to the Master of the Rolls to dispose of chancery business appear to have originated during the Chancellorship of Cardinal Wolsey, since which time he has sat regularly for the hearing of causes. For many years, however, his authority was a subject of great controversy, which was finally determined by the 3 Geo. 2, c. 30, which provided that all orders and decrees of the Master of the Rolls, except such as were appropriated to the Great Seal itself, should be deemed valid, subject only to an appeal to the Lord Chancellor. And by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 94, s. 24, the Master of the Rolls is to hear and determine motions, pleas, and demurrers subject to appeal to the Lord Chancellor. The growth of the importance of the custodian of the rolls may be illustrated by the fact that, as early as the reign of Richard II., the "six clerks" were appointed to assist him in his duties, and the subsequent appointments of "registrars" and "examiners" relieved him from much of the clerical labour which formerly devolved upon his office. In the meantime the masters in chancery were progressing in importance and dignity. As early as Richard II.'s reign references in causes were made to them; and for many years they even disposed of demurrers, a practice which was finally stopped by Lord Bacon on the commencement of his tenure of office as Lord Keeper; but for upwards of two centuries after his day they continued to exercise most important administrative and judicial functions.

For very many years the arrears of business in the Court of Chancery were the subject of loud complaints. Even under James I. a Bill for the appointment of two "assistant judges" for the Court of Chancery was introduced in the House of Commons, but (according to the late Mr. C. P. Cooper) "it went no further." Under the Commonwealth it was resolved that the Court of Chancery should be abolished, but the committee which was appointed by the Parliament decided that the scheme was impracticable. For a century and a half the evils complained of continued to increase, but in May, 1811, Mr. Michael Angelo Taylor carried (by the Speaker's casting vote) a motion for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the causes retarding the decision of suits in the Court of Chancery. A result of the deliberations of this body was the passing of the statute 53 Geo. 3, c. 24, authorizing the appointment of a second assistant to the Lord Chancellor, and Sir Thomas Plumer accordingly became the first "Vice-Chancellor of England"; but during the next quarter of a century the business of the court again became too much for the existing judicial staff, and at length, on the abolition of the equity jurisdiction of the Exchequer, Sir Robert Peel carried a Bill (5 Vict. c. 5) for the creation of two additional judgeships, and these posts were filled by Vice-Chancellors Knight Bruce and Wigram. On the death of Sir Lancelot Shadwell in 1850 the office of Vice-Chancellor of England was not filled up; and Sir James Wigram resigned his seat on the bench about the same time. The late Lord Cranworth was created a Vice-Chancellor (not "of England") in Sir L. Shadwell's place, but as the 9th section of the Act of 1841 had forbidden the appointment of a successor to the Vice-Chancellor secondly appointed thereby, and as the state of the business of the court rendered a reduction of its judicial staff impracticable, Lord Truro introduced and passed the statute 14 & 15 Vict. c. 4, authorizing the filling up of Sir J. Wigram's office. Later in the same year the statute 14 & 15 Vict. c. 83, established the two Lords Justices of Appeal to assist the Lord Chancellor in the appellate business of the court. In the following year the short Chancellorship of Lord St. Leonards was signalized by the passing of three important Acts for the amendment of the Court of Chancery. The first of these (15 & 16 Vict. c. 80), abolished the masters in chancery, and provided for the appointment of two chief clerks (with the necessary staff of assistants) to the Master of the Rolls and each of the Vice-Chancellors, and their number has since been increased to three for each judge.

Reviews.

MERCHANT SHIPPING ACTS.

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING LAWS: BEING A CONSOLIDATION OF ALL THE MERCHANT SHIPPING AND PASSENGER ACTS FROM 1854 TO 1876 INCLUSIVE, &c., &c., FORMING A COMPLETE TREATISE ON MARITIME LAW. By A. C. BOTE, LL.B., Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Sons.

The question may perhaps be an open one whether there is room for the present volume in a field already crowded with works upon shipping law. But, as compared with other text-books on the subject, this has, at any rate, the not inconsiderable merit of conciseness. As the author points out in his preface, the Merchant

Shipping Act, 1876, is the fifteenth Act of Parliament relating exclusively to merchant shipping that has been passed since 1854, when the principal Act consolidating the law as it then stood was passed; and in consequence of the numerous changes introduced by these various Acts the statute law on the subject is a somewhat complicated tangle. The plan of the present work is to set out the principal Act, inserting the sections of subsequent Acts throughout after the sections of the principal Act which they repeal or alter, so as to effect a consolidation of the whole of the Acts.

Originality for his scheme we fear the author cannot claim, for the book seems to be a transcript, with some alterations and additions, from the digest of the Merchant Shipping Acts, with index, which was prepared for the Board of Trade in 1875, and can, or could very recently, be purchased for three shillings. Mr. Boyd does not refer to the Board of Trade digest, but if he has not adopted it for his book there is certainly a remarkable coincidence between the two, though of course the Act of 1876 is incorporated in the one but not in the other. The only difference of plan is that Mr. Boyd has in one or two instances—and generally we think wisely—omitted to set out statutes which the Board of Trade had inserted, *e.g.*, the Chain Cables and Anchors Acts, 1864 and 1871, the Seamen's Fund Winding-up Act, 1851, and the Bills of Lading Act, 1855; and further Mr. Boyd has made a separate digest of the Passenger Acts instead of incorporating them, as in the Board of Trade digest, with the Merchant Shipping Acts. He has also (perhaps not so wisely) "attempted to introduce a uniformity of terms" by substituting throughout the Acts any term which has been altered from an earlier Act by a later one. Thus in the Act of 1854 the terms shipping masters and shipping offices are used, but as these names were abolished by the Act of 1862 and those of "superintendent of a mercantile marine office" and "mercantile marine offices" substituted, the latter terms have been used throughout. This would be no doubt desirable if this was an authoritative digest, but as it is only a collation the Board of Trade plan of leaving the term as in the original, but with a note to show the alteration, seems more desirable. The same may, perhaps, be said of the total omission in Mr. Boyd's book of repealed sections, which in the Board of Trade digest are set out in italics, with a note of the repealing section.

Mr. Boyd has, however, besides inserting the Act of 1876, made important additions to the Board of Trade digest which make his work of much greater value as a book of reference. In the first place, he has added a table of statutes, showing on what page the sections of the later Acts are to be found, an extremely useful addition, inasmuch as without such a table it is difficult at a moment's notice to find one of these sections, as they are necessarily scattered over the Act of 1854. Further, he has inserted many Orders in Council made in pursuance of the various sections, and has given references to decisions upon the Acts, and here and there short disquisitions upon the subject-matter, setting forth the case-law in a pithy and lucid manner. Thus six pages are devoted to the authorities upon bottomry, *respondentia*, and the sale of the ship by the master; nearly as much space is given to the decisions as to seamen's wages, and there are similar short excursuses upon collisions, pilots, wreck, salvage, the liability of shipowners for necessaries and general average, &c. It is, of course, difficult to judge how far the references to decisions are exhaustive, but it is somewhat surprising that in a book of this kind no allusion should be made to *Wilson* v. *London, Italian, and Adriatic Steam Navigation Company* (14 W. R. 101, L. R. 1 C. P. 61) on the 67th section of the Act of 1862, to *Le Blanche* (or *Mors Le Blanch*) v. *Wilson* (21 W. R. 109, L. R. 8 C. P. 227) on section 68 of the same Act; or to *Micklereid* v. *West* (24 W. R. 703, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 428) on the 169th section of the Act of 1854.

In dealing with the important subject of recent legislation upon the liability of shipowners for sending ships to sea in an unseaworthy condition, the author is very brief, but not quite so happy as in some parts of his book. In stating that the obligation is entirely new which is imposed by the 5th section of the Act as between owners and seamen, of using all reasonable means to insure the seaworthiness of the ship, he overlooks the fact that the obligation (perhaps in a slightly modified form) was created by the 11th section of the Act of 1871 and the 4th section of the Act of 1875, which, by making it penal to send a ship to sea unseaworthy, gave, according to the doctrine of *Couch* v. *Steel* (3 E. & B. 408), a right of action to any one injured thereby. These sections seem, indeed, entirely to have escaped Mr. Boyd's notice, for again, at p. 244, he speaks of section 4 of the Act of 1876 as "creating a new liability for shipowners," whereas that section is an almost *verbatim* re-enactment of the 4th section of the Act of 1875, which was not much in advance of section 11 of the Act of 1871. These sections are of course repealed, but the enactment in the new Act cannot be called new. The same may be said of the provisions as to load line in the Act of 1876, which Mr. Boyd at p. 31 calls "quite new," but which are really a re-enactment of practically the same provisions in the Act of 1875. For the most part, however, Mr. Boyd confines himself to short, and as far as we can judge correct, statements of the effect of actual decisions, avoiding original observations, a course which is prudent in a work of this kind as regards both bulk and accuracy.

General Correspondence.

"Dividing Commissions."

[*To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.*]

Sir,—Passing a winter's exile here for health's sake I am not the less observant of professional matters at home, and am glad to see the above subject mooted in your columns. I have often discussed it with friends in the profession, and shall be glad therefore to add my contribution to what has already appeared.

What surprises me, however, is that the practice in question seems to be treated by all the correspondents of the *Times* and by your correspondent "A London Solicitor" as something underhand and secret, "surreptitious" one writer says, neither common nor general, even of doubtful existence, and, at any rate, not acknowledged or followed by men of standing and respectability in any of the professions involved.

"A London Solicitor" seems to think he has clinched the matter in its moral aspect by asking the pointed question, "Will any solicitor assert that his client is aware that he is to divide the auctioneer's or broker's commission and approves of his doing so?"

Now, as one who found the practice established in the firm to which he belongs, and has since followed it openly and without reserve or trouble of conscience, believing it to be a recognized and established practice, I most confidently and truly make this very assertion, and I am so far in agreement with your correspondent in principle that I fully admit that if I could not truly make the assertion, or if the practice had to be concealed at any time when there was reasonable occasion for stating it, I and the practice itself would alike stand *ipso facto* condemned.

I am in the habit of regularly employing certain stockbrokers and auctioneers who I believe to be thoroughly competent in their respective callings, and who, I may say, have proved to me their competence by long experience. With these I have a standing arrangement for division of charges in certain proportions. I have never "demanded," "exacted," or otherwise unwillingly compelled the observance of the arrangement, but find it very honourably respected, and business willingly ac-

cepted under its terms. I really cannot tell at this distance of time which side may have originated the arrangements in question, but it is quite as likely the proposals came from the other side as from mine.

Now it is a matter of constant occurrence that a client comes to me with some matter of business involving the employment of a broker or auctioneer, and if the client has not already decided upon some one whom he knows (in which case *cadit* the commission question) the point is sure to give rise to a little discussion. The client is in doubt, and I tell him that we have our own men with whom we are accustomed to work, and whom it is a benefit to ourselves to employ because of the professional usage by which they divide charges with us. The invariable answer is, "Oh, then! employ them by all means."

In many other ways it is my constant habit to refer to the subject with clients. In discussing securities for the investment of money I have many times recommended the bonds of the Mersey Dock Board, adding that we solicitors don't like them because the Board won't pay us the usual commission of 2s. 6d. per cent. for the procuration.

So also as to life insurances. It is so easy to choose a first-class office that not much advice is required, and I am quite sure it is an every-day occurrence for solicitors to secure the sending in of proposals through themselves for the mere sake of the commission paid by the office, making no charge to their clients in the matter, while I can recall instances in which a client being in doubt between two such offices as, say, the Metropolitan and the Law, I have told him that really the only difference was that one would and the other would not pay us commission, the decision being then in favour of the commission office.

Now, although I do not at all agree in either the facts or the inferences of your correspondent "A London Solicitor," I am quite willing to admit that the practice in question, like any other, is open to abuse. I myself found that it could not be made applicable to charges for valuations for the purpose of mortgages without possible injury to clients' interests or obstruction to business. So that I think the whole matter well worthy of the deliberate and unprejudiced consideration of the Council of the Law Society, whose paternal counsel on the subject would certainly be respected by me.

But, I think that if the council is to take up an inquiry on the subject it should go wider a field than considering the relations between solicitors on the one side and stockbrokers and auctioneers on the other. They should also take into account the above mooted point as to insurance offices, and they must not forget that in dividing commissions with stockbrokers solicitors only follow the perfectly unvarying practice of bankers. Of commission transactions between solicitors and accountants, liquidators, and others, I have no experience whatever.

But I further commend it to the attention of the council to justify if possible the practice of solicitors purchasing parchment at 2s. per skin, and retailing it to their clients at 5s., employing law stationers who do all copying at a charge to them of 1½d. per folio, and charging the clients for the same work at 4d. per folio, and many other equally humiliating and degrading customs. I say that such as these are far more objectionable than the dividing of charges with fellow-professionals, and it is no answer at all that one is legalized and the other ignored by written law. The moral principle, which I understand to be that in question, remains the same. O. L. H.

Algiers, Jan. 12.

Lay Impropriators and Chancels.

[*To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.*]

Sir,—All text writers appear to agree that lay impropriators are bound to repair the chancels of the churches of the parishes from whence they take their tithes. In an appeal for a contribution towards raising the sum of £1,000 to endow a Norfolk living, the vicar states that no patron ever gave the living anything except the site of the vicarage-house and £20 a year; and it appears that the tithes which he takes are about £800 a year, and that the chancel is in ruins.

The appeal also states that the archdeacon reports the church to be in the worst condition of any in the archdeaconry, so that the bishop cannot be unaware of the condition of its chancel.

The farmers are nearly, if not quite, all of them tenants of the lay impropriator so that they cannot take action in the matter.

What is the best course for the vicar to take to compel the lay impropriator to do his duty by repairing this chancel? A. H. A.

Jan. 16.

Commission for Oaths.

[*To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.*]

Sir,—In the former part of the year 1874 I obtained commissions for taking affidavits in the then existing Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer respectively, and the district assigned to me by these commissions was limited to Somerset and the adjoining counties of (speaking from memory) Wilts, Dorset, and Devon.

Under these circumstances I should esteem it an obligation if you would kindly favour me with your opinion, in the columns of your next Saturday's issue, whether, by virtue of the Judicature Acts, the rules thereunder, or otherwise, I am now empowered to administer in London or elsewhere outside the limits of the district formerly assigned to me by my commissions, oaths in causes and matters depending in the Supreme Court of Judicature; and further, should you be of opinion that I may now act as a commissioner in London, whether it is essential that for the mere purpose of so acting I should take out a London certificate. At present I am only certificated for the country. A Country Commissioner.

[See the observations *ante*, under the head of "Current Topics"; also Braithwaite's Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature, pp. 13 to 18.—Ed. *S. J.*]

There have been many complaints this week of the want of courts for judges in the common law divisions. On Wednesday Mr. Justice Grove announced he would be unable to sit on Friday, owing to the want of accommodation. He said, "There is a judge ready and willing to sit if only a proper room can be found." The subject was again raised in the course of Thursday, by an inquiry from the bar whether, in the event of the list of appeals from inferior courts being disposed of before four o'clock, the court would go on with the special paper. Lord Coleridge, in reply, stated that it was never contemplated by him to subordinate important special cases to appeals from inferior courts; all that was intended was that if a building could be found, certain special cases would be taken before a single judge on the days which had been fixed for the hearing of appeals from inferior courts. As to the more important special cases in which it had been agreed by counsel that they should be argued before more than one judge, the court would arrange to fix a special day for them if the bar would arrange to furnish the master with a list of such cases. As to the difficulty of a room, Lord Coleridge said that he, for his part, required nothing luxurious or extravagant, but the difficulty was to get any building at all. The Bail Court had been placed at their disposal that day, and would be available also on Monday, but after that nothing was certain. Mr. Humphreys writes to the *Times* to suggest that, even at the busiest period of the parliamentary session, not more than half the committee-rooms of either Lords or Commons are occupied. The Supreme Court of Appeal at Westminster always sits in room E, House of Lords. Why should not two or three other spare committee-rooms be placed at the disposal of the judges when necessity arose, thereby facilitating business and saving suitors large expense?

Cases of the Week.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER—SALE OF LAND TO BE PAID FOR AT A SPECIFIED PRICE PER ACRE—PART OF LAND INCLUDED IN A PUBLIC DRAIN—VENDOR AND PURCHASER ACT, 1874, s. 9.—In a case of *Re Popple and Barratt's Contract*, heard by the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., a contract had been entered into for the sale of a close of grass land in Lincolnshire which was described as "bounded on the east by the Sir Rowland's drain." The land was to be paid for "at the price of £100 per statute acre, to be surveyed." The drain in question was a public drain under the jurisdiction of drainage commissioners. It had once formed a portion of the channel of a natural river, but the river had been diverted by the commissioners into another channel, and the old channel had been retained as a drain. When the acreage came to be measured on behalf of the vendor, and the draft of the conveyance prepared, he claimed to include in that which was to be paid for the land *usque ad medium filum aquæ*. The quantity up to the bank of the drain was 21a. 3r. 33p. The quantity, if the measurement was extended *ad medium filum*, was 23a. 0r. 26p., thus making a difference of 1a. 0r. 33p. The purchaser insisted that he was only bound to pay for the lesser quantity, and he took out a summons under the Vendor and Purchaser Act asking that the vendor might be ordered to convey to him, on payment of the rateable price for the smaller quantity. The Court of Appeal (James, L.J., and Baggallay and Bramwell, JJ.A.) affirmed the decision of Hall, V.C., that, if the purchaser insisted on having the contract completed, he must pay at the agreed rate for that which he would get, viz., the land *ad medium filum*. The court also intimated an opinion that the summary jurisdiction created by section 9 of the Act was not intended to apply to a case where there were disputed facts, but was only meant to afford a ready means of settling short points of law or construction.

BANKRUPTCY PETITION—DEBTOR'S SUMMONS—TENDER OF PETITIONING CREDITOR'S DEBT AND COSTS—DISCRETION OF COURT AS TO MAKING ADJUDICATION—BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 2, SUB-SECTION 6; ss. 8, 9.—In a case of *Re Brigstocke*, heard by the Court of Appeal on the 18th inst., the question was raised whether, when, upon the hearing of a bankruptcy petition founded upon an act of bankruptcy committed by the omission to comply with the requirements of a debtor's summons (an act of bankruptcy of which, therefore, the summoning creditor alone could avail himself to obtain an adjudication), a tender is made of the full amount of the petitioning creditor's debt and costs, the court is bound (the existence of the debt and the act of bankruptcy having been proved) to make an adjudication, or whether it has a discretion in the matter. Under the particular circumstances of the case it became ultimately unnecessary to decide this question, though it was fully discussed. But the court (James, L.J., and Bramwell and Amphlett, JJ.A.) intimated an opinion that in such circumstances there would be a discretion, under section 8 of the Act, to refuse to make an adjudication. It would be, they said, very hard that a perfectly solvent man, who had *bonâ fide* disputed a debt which he was willing to pay as soon as the court had decided that it was one, should perforce be adjudicated a bankrupt.

APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE FINDING OF OFFICIAL REFEREE.—In the Exchequer Division, before Kelly, C.B., and Cleasby, B., a discussion took place, on the 13th inst., as to the effect of the findings of the official referees in cases tried before them. The plaintiff and defendant in the action of *Stubbs* v. *Boyle* had reduced the terms of an agreement to writing; a dispute had ensued, amongst other things as to whether an interlineation made by the defendant had been assented to, and acted on by, the plaintiff. The referee found generally for the plaintiff, and the defendant moved to set the report aside, relying on the concluding words of section 58 of the Judicature Act of 1873, by which the report of any referee upon any question of fact shall (unless set aside by the court) be equivalent to the finding of a jury. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the report might be treated like the verdict of a jury, and be set aside as contrary to the evidence. The court allowed the evidence which was before the referee to be read and discussed, but finally held that the section only contemplated a setting aside on proper grounds, such as have been hitherto held sufficient for referring an award back to an arbitrator. The defendant further moved to refer the report back for detailed findings, which was also refused, and Mr. Baron Cleasby added that the court would not encourage such applications, on any state of facts whatever, after the matters had been gone into and decided by the referee.

UNDISCHARGED DEBTOR—SECOND LIQUIDATION PETITION—RIGHTS OF NEW CREDITORS.—A curious question as to the rights of the creditors of a liquidating debtor who had contracted new debts before he had obtained his discharge, and had filed a second liquidation petition, arose before the Chief Judge, on the 15th inst., in a case of *Re Caughey*. Two partners filed a liquidation petition in 1870. Their creditors resolved that they should have their discharge when they had paid 2s. in the pound. Their estate realized only 10½d. in the pound. One of them commenced business again alone, and in 1873 he filed a second liquidation petition. All his creditors, joint and separate, were summoned to the meeting under this petition. They appointed a trustee and empowered him to sell the debtor's estate to him for £475, upon payment of which sum it was resolved that the debtor should be entitled to his discharge. The £475 was duly paid to the second trustee. It was, however, claimed by the first trustee for the benefit of the joint creditors, and this claim was held by the court to be well founded (*Ex parte Ford*, 24 W. R. 590, L. R. 1 Ch. D. 521) to the extent necessary to make up the 2s. in the pound. The £475 was then handed over by the second trustee to the first. After this the second trustee claimed the goods which were in the debtor's possession, and the judge of the county court held that he was entitled to them and ordered the debtor to deliver them up. The Chief Judge reversed this decision, holding that on payment of the £475 to the second trustee, the debtor was discharged from the claims of all his creditors. He had nothing to do with the question how the money was to be administered, and he could not be required to pay it a second time. The practical result, therefore, was that the new creditors had given the debtor his discharge for nothing.

BILL OF SALE—ACT OF BANKRUPTCY—REGISTRATION.—The same day, in a case of *Re Jackson*, a trader, in May, 1876, gave a creditor a bill of sale, by way of mortgage, of all his property, in consideration of an old debt of £40 and a fresh advance of £20. It was agreed that the bill of sale should not be registered, but that the grantor should at any time, at the request of the grantee, give him a new bill of sale in lieu of the first. In July a new bill of sale was given in pursuance of this agreement, and was duly registered. In the same month the grantee took possession of the property. In September the grantor filed a liquidation petition. The county court judge held that the bill of sale was void against the trustee. But the Chief Judge held that it was valid, on the ground that the original first advance was sufficient to support it, and that the agreement to postpone the registration until the creditor should call for it was perfectly lawful.

Societies.

LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY.

At the meeting of this society held at the Law Institution on Tuesday last, Mr. Rouse in the chair, the question for discussion was as follows:—"Does the policy of the Government on the Eastern Question deserve the confidence of the country?" Mr. Goody, who opened the debate in the negative, suggested that the question should be argued with an utter absence of party feeling on both sides, and, with one or two exceptions, this rule was strictly adhered to. Mr. Fellows followed on the affirmative side, and after a long and animated debate the question was decided in the affirmative by a majority of five votes. Twenty-eight members were present.

UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY.

This society resumed its meetings at Clement's-inn Hall, Strand, on Wednesday, the 17th inst., when the following subject was discussed. "That bar students and articled clerks should be educated together and pass the same examinations." After an animated debate, the motion was carried by a majority of five. Previously to the discussion, motions had been passed in favour of the establishment of a prize to be called "The Union Prize," open to the competition of members of the various societies in union, and also for the formation of a law library. The secretary made a statement to the effect that the Incorporated Law Society had given permission to hold meetings for the discussion of legal points in one of the rooms of the Law Institution, and also right of access to the library for the purpose of obtaining the necessary authorities.

LAW AMENDMENT SOCIETY.

AMENDMENT OF THE PROCEDURE IN MAGISTRATES' COURTS.

At a meeting of the Law Amendment Society held on Monday last, C. H. Hopwood, Esq., Q.C., M.P., in the chair, Mr. Serjeant Cox read the following paper:—The procedure in the superior courts has been amended, if not by the abbreviation anticipated, by approximating the language of the forms to the understanding of those to whom they are addressed. The county courts have set a good example. They also are popular courts, whereas, in the magistrates' courts, the suitors, for the most part, appear in person to conduct their own cases; consequently, there are special reasons why the procedure should be as simple and intelligible as possible. The county courts have done this, and have found no difficulty in the working of it. Nevertheless, the magistrates' courts, although having many more suitors and a much greater proportion of them appearing in person without professional aid than in the county courts, are permitted to continue the whole cumbrous procedure and the same tedious and unintelligible forms as before.

Some time ago communications passed between the late Mr. Oke and myself upon this subject. He entered into the question with characteristic zeal. I assisted him in preparing a scheme of magistrates' courts reform. I was to have brought it before the House of Commons. We proposed to simplify procedure and materially abbreviate all the forms. The loss of my seat prevented this second reform from taking the first step in that session. I believe that Mr. Oke afterwards endeavoured to enlist some other members in the work, and that his Bill was printed. At all events it perished at its birth, and nothing has been heard of it since.

It will be remembered that, a short time ago, the present able and energetic Home Secretary, Mr. Cross, publicly commented upon the committals from magistrates' courts, asserting that many more persons were in prison than ought to be there. He attributed this to imperfections in the law, or rather in the processes by which the law was enforced, and hinted that he proposed to grapple with the question of penalties and their enforcement with a view to limit the number of imprisonments. As Mr. Cross is a man who performs his promises and who is not afraid to legislate boldly when satisfied that a reform is needed, I have no doubt that he will, before long, if not in the coming session, act upon this resolution. Should he do so, it is most desirable that advantage should be taken of the subject being mooted to reform the whole procedure of magistrates' courts. He would have no serious opposition to encounter, for the members of Parliament are themselves magistrates, and none know better than they the defects of the present procedure and the inconveniences that result from them as much to the magistrate as to the suitor. It is with the hope that this part of the question may attract the attention of Mr. Cross that I bring the subject before the society.

At present a summons is presumed to be issued only after a formal information taken on oath before a magistrate, thus making a *quasi*-judicial business of that which ought to be, as in every other court it is, a purely formal process. The origin of this ceremony, doubtless, was to enable the magistrate to determine, before a case is brought before him formally, if it was one over which he had jurisdiction. In practice this rule is now rarely observed. It would be physically impossible, for a magistrate cannot always be found, and it would be hard if a complainant were compelled to travel many miles, as often he would, to make his complaint in person. The law has been only rendered tolerable by what is really a breach in it. Save in certain cases, where an information on oath is expressly required by some statute, the summons is issued by the clerk without a sworn information, leaving that part of the ceremony to be performed after the event, if the need should arise. In pursuance of the same scheme, the summons is required to be signed by the magistrate, on the assumption that he has already heard the complaint on the information, and determined it to be *primâ facie* a valid one. But although professing to be issued on this information, it is, in fact, not only issued without the sworn information, but where the court sits at long intervals, or the magistrate, as in many country places, lives far away, the summons is signed in blank and no inconvenience or injustice has ever yet resulted from the arrangement, which, though extremely convenient to all parties concerned, is not regular.

What should be the change in this initial process? Assimilate the magistrates' court to the county court. Let there be a short plaint upon which (unless he sees in it a charge obviously out of the jurisdiction) the magistrates' clerk should issue the summons under the seal of the court, the party requiring it paying the nominal fee of a shilling for the summons, with a charge of mileage for service, unless the service be undertaken by the complainant. The plaint should state the charge very briefly. It should be signed by the complainant, and where the charge is made under the provisions of some statute, it should state the statute, for, as it is, defendants are often very much perplexed to discover what the charge is they are required to answer.

The plaint might run thus:—

"A. B., of Pinner, in the county of Middlesex, grocer, complains of C. D., of , that on the 1st of January, 1877, at Pinner aforesaid, he did assault the said A. B. (or that he was upon the land of A. B., of , in pursuit of game), &c."

The summons should with equal brevity run thus:—

"To C. D., .—You are summoned to appear before the justices of the peace at the petty sessions of the Gore division of the county of Middlesex, at Edgware, on Wednesday, the day of next, at 11 o'clock in the forenoon, to answer the complaint of A. B., of Pinner, in the said county, grocer, that you did assault him on, &c. (copying the plaint).

"E. P., Clerk to the Justices of the said division.

"TAKE NOTICE.—If you fail to appear, the justices will proceed to hear and determine the charge against you, or will issue a warrant for your apprehension at their pleasure."

There are few lawyers not familiar with the wonderful documents that now are supposed to convey to defendants in many cases the information that they are charged with an offence that might be stated in two lines at the utmost. A foolscap page, closely printed, is only a modest specimen of this. Some extend to nearly two pages. Criticising their contents, however, the origin of this wonderful wordiness is apparent. It seems to have been a fixed notion with our legal ancestors that every document should be complete in itself, and show the whole history of the case, and by what authority it was dealt with, and how disposed of, so that the learned eye should not find a flaw in it and say, "Why you have convicted John Smith, and you do not in this record of it show that you did all that was necessary to give you jurisdiction to try him and convict him." Hence the tediousness of all these processes. The judges sanctioned the practice of picking holes, not in the substance of them only, but in the most trifling matters of form. Therefore lawyers strove to adapt the forms to successive decisions, and to avoid possible difficulties by anticipating every conceivable objection. So the forms used in the courts grew to be the formidable creations we find them. They have been for the most part reformed elsewhere; but they are still permitted to cumber magistrates' courts in the shape that was once a necessity but now has become an absurdity.

The adoption of this simple process of a plaint, briefly stating the charge, and a summons as briefly copying the plaint, would at once sweep away some hundreds of printed forms which magistrates' clerks are now obliged to keep, which are addressed to the litigants in magis-

trates' courts, which they are presumed to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest, but of which, I venture to say, they do not and cannot understand a single sentence. The same reduction to a short, plain statement of the matter *sub judice* should be adopted in all documents employed in these courts, and which are all equally capable of abbreviation.

The procedure at the hearing is upon the whole satisfactory. But two or three amendments might be introduced with advantage, which I will briefly describe.

1. The court should be empowered to consolidate plaints arising out of the same subject-matter, not only between the same parties but between different parties. For instance, in charges of assault there are frequently cross summonses between the same parties, or several summonses against other parties, each desirous to give his account of the affair, and to prevent his adversary from telling his own story. It was one transaction—one quarrel—one row—and it is a waste of time, and a source of confusion and perplexity to the magistrate, and often the cause of substantial injustice to some of the parties, to be compelled to treat each charge as a distinct offence. Justice might be better done by having the whole story told at once, and the relative merits of the various charges determined together. It might well be left to the court to say what is a proper matter for such a consolidation.

But this would compel another much demanded amendment. The Evidence Act should be extended to all offences not indictable. It was an unfortunate decision by which that Act was held not to extend to summary convictions, on the unsatisfactory ground that all cases punished by a penalty are *quasi*-criminal. I doubt if this was the intention of Parliament; certainly it was not that of the author of the statute, which was originally suggested to him by myself and drawn with my assistance. I certainly contemplated the exception to apply to offences really criminal and not merely *quasi*-criminal. The result is, that the magistrates' courts witness a vast number of cases which, being criminal only in form, are merely civil disputes, but which are deprived of the advantage the law has provided for the trial of such disputes. If, for instance, B. charges C. with assaulting him, B. can give his account of the affair, but C. cannot. But C. takes out a cross summons charging B. with assaulting him, and then C. tells his story but B. is not heard. The magistrate is, in strictness of law, bound to determine each case upon the evidence given in that case, and properly he might convict each on the evidence of the other. Practically, he treats the two cases as one, and decides on the merits of the whole. But he does so contrary to the strict rule of law. This, however, is not the whole anomaly. If B. brings an action against C. for the same assault either in the county court or in the High Court, C. is admitted to be a witness and has the privilege, which had been denied him in the magistrates' court, of telling his own story. Should B. be charged as a putative father in a bastardy case, he can be a witness for himself; but if charged with keeping a dog without a licence, he is not permitted to be heard in explanation or in answer.

These instances might be multiplied indefinitely. They suffice to exhibit the anomalies of the present procedure and the need for its amendment. I repeat that the reform required is simply to limit the exception of the Evidence Act to indictable offences.

I am, of course, aware that many influential opinions incline to remove the exception altogether, and make the defendants in all criminal cases admissible as witnesses for themselves. For my own part, I dissent from this view for reasons too numerous to be considered now. But I have no hesitation in advocating it in all cases only *quasi*-criminal—which are disposed of by summary conviction.

It may be added that the adoption of such an amendment in the procedure of magistrates would give a fair trial to the experiment and might be recommended on this ground alone. The conviction should be in the shortest form, merely reciting the plaint, that it was heard on such a day, and that such was the judgment. A general power of amendment of all proceedings should be given to the magistrate. Power should also be given to him to direct an indictment for perjury in any case, the costs to be paid as are the costs of other prosecutions. In all cases if the defendant does not appear on proof of service of the summons, the court should be empowered to hear and determine the charge. If the defendant afterwards appears and shows good cause for his absence, the magistrate should be empowered to re-hear the case on such terms as he may impose. In short the provision of the recent Employers and Workmen Act should be extended to all cases. The court should also be empowered to grant a new hearing upon terms.

Instead of the indecisive designation of the magistrates' courts, some more definite title should be given to them, by which all the proceedings should be described. It might be the justices' court at Edgware, or as the case is. Each court should have an official seal. The clerk should be paid by salary, not by fees. A table of fees and costs should be settled by the Home Office. These, together with all fines, should be paid to a common court fund, from which the salaries and other expenses of the court should be defrayed. The magistrates should be empowered to order payment of any expenses incurred by prosecutors or witnesses in the discovery of offences or pursuit of offenders, as also to give rewards for special services, as the superior courts are now permitted to do in cases of felony.

A verified account of the receipts and expenditure should be returned yearly, and any balance remaining paid over to the Treasury. The present system of fees and costs is very unsatisfactory. In practice the penalty is measured by the costs. The magistrate requires to know what the costs are before he can determine what the penalty shall be, because the costs are of uncertain amount, and he must consider them as being a part of the punishment. Hence the apparent injustice so often noted, of a sentence to "penalty 1s. and costs 10s.," and such like. To the outside world this seems very unfair, and is the cause of much complaint. In truth, it is only an adjustment of the penalty, which would otherwise have been reversed, and the sentence would have been 10s. penalty and 1s. costs. The expenses of witnesses are, of course, quite independent of the court fees, and are incapable of regulation.

And this brings me to a question of considerable importance, because lately mooted by Mr. Cross as being a defect in our law calling for amendment. I refer to the enforcement of penalties. Mr. Cross objected to a too frequent resort to imprisonment. Hundreds of persons, he said, are in gaol who ought not to be there. But he suggested no specific plan by which the same end could be obtained by other means. All must admit that if a substitute for imprisonment could be found it ought to be provided. I have anxiously considered this question, hoping to discover some solution to the problem. If there is to be any punishment at all there is no choice between a fine and imprisonment. But a fine is no penalty unless it be paid. Not to enforce the payment is to give practical impunity to offenders, and would speedily reduce us to a condition of anarchy. How, then, may a man be made to pay the penalty he has incurred? Some little improvement might be made by enabling the magistrates to order payment by instalments, by giving them a claim upon the employer for wages due, and by power to levy an immediate distress. But all of these would be worthless remedies as against the great majority of defendants. For the most part they are idlers, loafers, lodgers, possessing nothing tangible, and if unable to pay in purse, and they were not obliged to pay in person, the law would be a dead letter, and justice a mockery.

One practicable step to this end has occurred to me. Sureties might be allowed to be taken for payment of penalties, and in some cases also of proved poverty; sureties might be taken for good behaviour in lieu of imprisonment, with, however, a distinct proviso that, in case of forfeiture, the imprisonment should be doubled. I mean by this that B. should be sentenced to pay a penalty say of £1, or in default, imprisonment for a month. If he satisfies the court that he cannot pay the penalty presently or prospectively, the court should be empowered to say to B., "Enter into your own recognizances (or find a surety, as the case may be) to be of good behaviour for six months. If you forfeit those recognizances by any fresh offence the condition is that you will be imprisoned for two months, instead of for the one month to which you are now sentenced." These are the only relaxations of imprisonment for non-payment of penalties which, after much thought given to the subject, I can suggest.

Lastly, I think the practice of admitting to bail prisoners committed for trial might be considerably extended with safety, and if with safety certainly

with advantage. My own long experience has satisfied me of this. During the twelve years I have presided at the Middlesex Sessions, we have tried upwards of 20,000 prisoners, of whom at least 2,000 have been on bail. Now, not a few of these have been persons of property, charged with grave offences. But during the whole of that time I cannot recall half a dozen instances of escape by the accused by forfeiture of bail. It is also a remarkable fact that all of those who did not appear were persons of the better class. I do not remember a single instance of forfeiture of bail by a person belonging to the class that supplies ninety-nine in a hundred of those committed for trial.

Other minor amendments in the practice of magistrates' courts would, doubtless, present themselves to the framer of a measure with that object. I throw out these suggestions to show how much reform is needed, and how simple and easily to be introduced are the remedies to be applied.

BRIGHTON AND SUSSEX LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY.

At the inaugural meeting of this society on the 10th inst., Mr. F. Merrifield, barrister, delivered an address, from which we take the following extracts:—The law used to be spoken of as a kind of ark, which it would be something approaching to sacrilege to criticize or alter. Old English writers speak of it as the perfection of reason, and even comparatively recent ones, like the commentator Blackstone, seem never to weary in their panegyrics of it. On the other hand, the outside public has an intense distrust and dislike of it, and of its practitioners. "The first thing we do," Shakespeare represents Jack Cade as saying, "let us kill all the lawyers." And even now there is a very general impression among ordinary persons that the law is a collection of artificial and complicated rules, having no relation to justice, and contrived for hampering actions and levying toll upon the dealings of mankind; the truth being, I apprehend, that the existing law is the imperfect result of endeavours to do justice between man and man, and to introduce general rules by the observance of which persons may be secured and protected in the enjoyment of life and property, and in various rights and duties. A little reflection on this will show that the law must be in the main a reasonable thing, and a technical as well as a liberal science. No one can have even the slight knowledge of English law acquired by reading the authorities upon any leading principle, without seeing how plastic the law is, and how —although occasionally distorted by sinister or prejudiced influences—it has been moulded and modified in the main by the desire to bring it into harmony with the requirements of the community. It is wanting in the symmetry of a geometrical design, but that is because, like the shell of the mollusc it is the product of the growth of the living organization, which it protects at the same time that it hampers it. In saying this, I am not intimating any leaning against the application of codification to our law, or to different branches of it. On the contrary, I think the extent to which, for want of decided cases, we are often left to grope for simple rules, which any code would be sure to contain, is discreditable to our law. But I desire to point out that the law, as we have it, is the product of reasonable and right motives, working, of course, with imperfect materials. I wish also to point out that such as we find the law, it has been arrived at by what may be described as the competitive exertions of the finest judicial and legislative intellects acting through a long succession of ages. When you reflect on this I think you will see that there is a strong presumption as to any rule of law that it had its origin in reason and justice, that unless circumstances are materially altered since it was established, there is a strong presumption in favour of its continuance; but, on the other hand, that it must, from the very nature of its origin, contain much that is obsolete. To the student it appears to me important that he should have a just view of the real nature and origin of the law. That will protect him, on the one hand, from supposing that he can deduce from his text-books sharp and clear principles which will enable him to advise with unerring accuracy on the complicated affairs of men; and, on the other hand, from relinquishing the search for authorities from an apprehension that he is pursuing an *ignis fatuus*, the chase of which can only end by leaving him "in wandering mazes lost." I said the law is a liberal profession, but it has a dangerous tendency in a direction which is the reverse of liberal. Every member of any branch of the legal profession, except the comparatively small number of those who perform judicial functions, is almost wholly engaged in advocating, or in some manner promoting, the interests of a client. In this respect he has nothing in common with the knight of old (probably of fanciful) times, who went about redressing human wrongs, but much in common with the mercenary whose sword and arm were at the service of those who would pay for them. His first duty, indeed, as advocate, solicitor, or agent, is towards the interests of his employers. He has, as a general rule, not to concern himself with what is just or desirable in itself, but simply to get as much success as he can for the side on which he is engaged. There are no doubt limits to this principle of action, but they have so seldom to be taken into account that they do not prevent a lawyer from forming the habit of working very hard to promote a cause without reference to whether it is right or wrong. This must be the tendency of the life he leads, and it must give him a strong bias towards taking a cynical view of human affairs. Now, cynicism has its uses, but, as a mood, it can be productive of no positive good work such as the world expects of its citizens, and such as a man must do if he is to attain his full moral and intellectual stature. I am very glad, therefore, to see that your rules provide for the discussion of topics of general interest, and I hope every member will make it a point to attend regularly, and occasionally take a part in these. They will afford a scope for individual character and conviction, and for that higher kind of speaking which is the necessary creation of strong convictions. At present, I have not attempted to indicate the legal subjects to which your attention can be very profitably directed. You can hardly make a bad selection. The fact of your forming such a society is an evidence that you have felt the need of a machinery for discussing legal questions and promoting the study of the law, and it may be assumed that those branches of the law on which the need of further information is most strongly felt will be most in favour with those on whom the choice of subjects devolves. It seems sufficiently obvious that the preference should in general be given to such as ought to be learned at some time and yet cannot be acquired by those who have been engaged in active practice. Among the subjects having this claim for preference, it seems to me that a further preference might be made in favour of those that are of the widest application. For instance, a knowledge of the principles of conveyancing seems to me of less importance than that of the law of contracts, a familiarity with the Judicature Acts less valuable to a student than an intelligent appreciation of the rules of evidence. I advisedly used the word conveyancing instead of the law of real property, because the outlines of that law—those, for example, which have to do with the settlement of and succession to landed estates—should be known to all. It will have been gathered from the remarks I have made that I regard the society as a valuable one. But too much must not be expected from it. The actual legal knowledge that can be acquired by its means can go but a very little way towards making a good lawyer. I do not disparage the knowledge actually to be gained through it. A legal maxim accepted with the implicit loyalty with which the mind of the student always apprehends it, as if it contained all human wisdom on that subject, and was not only accurate but complete and exhaustive, is useful throughout life, and even when experience has shown how rarely a maxim is applicable without qualification it still holds a place as one of the fixed landmarks in a shifting and sometimes perplexing scene. But what is of more value than knowledge of the law, is the habit of using the law, the sound legal habit of mind which the student-period of life gives the means of acquiring. The lawyer in practice, especially in the country, is generally in what may be called, from the legal point of view, low company—in that, for example, of noble lords and baronets who are magistrates, of borough and other magistrates who are not mere noble lords or baronets, of county court judges whose work is almost as much administrative as judicial, with a certain proportion of solicitors who hunt foxes or discount bills according to personal character or local circumstances; all of these being occupations more

or less honourable, civilly speaking, but most of them depreciatory from the strictly legal point of view, whereas the law student keeps the best society, better than that of her Majesty's judges, for he has in his library the pick and choice of all the Lord Chancellors and judges of several centuries as well as of the best writers on jurisprudence. He may consort with Coke and Hale and Somers, or with Austin and Maine, and on their judgments and treatises may model his modes of thought as well as his form of expression But even if he should make so good a use of his opportunities as to doubt like Eldon, or to discourse like Sugden, still he must not suppose his success is assured. Legal knowledge and legal apprehension are not the most valuable attributes he can have. For example, they are not to be compared with such qualities as industry and judgment. I would back for success in life the sensible man who works hard, though he knows very little law and cannot appreciate a fine argument, against the most learned lawyer who is wrong-headed and wilful. Shall I give those remarks a practical application? Well, then, it is possible some among you may think his career has been wrongly chosen, that in choosing the law he or his friends made a mistake; that he would have made a first-rate cavalry officer, a glorious painter, a charming poet, or a fine duke. Without denying that there are those so imperfectly constituted that they can only find a safe footing on some one or two of the numerous walks of life, may I venture to suppose that these are exceptional cases, and that in the majority of instances a young fellow who is discontented with his work is so because he is wanting, not in special aptitude, but in some more general quality—for example, in perseverance—and that this defect would show itself whatever had been the line in which he had begun life? We read "How sweet a poet was in Murray lost." But though the poet was lost the great judge emerged, and Lord Mansfield, instead of lamenting over his literary aptitude as wasted, made of it the brightest ornament of his judicial office. May I, then, venture to suggest that no amount of success in the work of this society should lead any member of it to think that he may safely disregard the cultivation of those general qualities such as perseverance, industry, calm reflection, forbearance, judgment, and general reasonableness, which, if I am right in my theory that they are more conducive to success in a profession than merely professional aptitude or learning, should, even in the course of a technical study, never be undervalued.

Appointments, Etc.

Mr. GEORGE JOHN BRAIKENRIDGE, solicitor, of 16, Bartlett's-buildings, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature in England.

Mr. WILLIAM BROWNE, solicitor, has been appointed Assistant Queen's Proctor in the Department of the Solicitor to the Treasury. Mr. Browne was for several years managing clerk to the late Queen's Proctor, Mr. Francis Hart Dyke.

Mr. JOHN TALIESIN DAVIES, solicitor, of Neath, Glamorganshire, has been appointed by the Lord Chancellor a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature in England.

Mr. JOHN DAW, jun., solicitor, of Exeter and Tiverton, has been appointed Registrar of the Southampton County Court (Circuit No. 51), in succession to Mr. Henry John Walker, appointed district registrar at Manchester under the Judicature Acts. Mr. Daw is the son of Mr. John Daw, solicitor, of Exeter. He was admitted a solicitor in 1857, and has been for seventeen or eighteen years registrar of the Tiverton County Court.

Mr. JOHN EDWARDS HILL, solicitor, of Halifax, has been elected Clerk to the Hipperholme Local Board of Health. Mr. Hill was admitted a solicitor in 1854, and is one of the deputy-coroners for the county of York.

Mr. GEORGE WILLIAM MAXSTED, solicitor (of the firm of Maxsted & Gibson), of Lancaster, has been appointed Under-Sheriff of Lancashire for the ensuing year. Mr. Maxsted was admitted a solicitor in 1840, and is clerk to the Commissioners of Property, Income, and Assessed Taxes for Lancaster, and holds several other appointments.

Mr. WILLIAM EDWARD RICHARDSON, solicitor, of Birmingham, has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner for Warwickshire, Staffordshire, and Worcestershire for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women.

Mr. MAURICE WILSON, solicitor, of Bradford, Yorkshire, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature in England.

Mr. THOMAS WOODCOCK, jun., solicitor (of the firm of Woodcock & Sons), of Haslingden and Ramsbottom, has been elected Clerk to the Haslingden Board of Guardians and Superintendent-Registrar of the Haslingden District, in succession to his father, Mr. Thomas Woodcock, who is registrar of the Haslingden County Court. Mr. Woodcock, jun., was admitted a solicitor in 1865, and is clerk to the local boards for the districts of Rawtenstall and Haslingden, and clerk to the burial boards at Rawtenstall and Ramsbottom.

Legal News.

Mr. Justice Hawkins was entertained on Monday evening, at the Albion Tavern, by the members of the South-Eastern Circuit, at a congratulatory banquet to celebrate his elevation to the bench. Mr. Serjeant Ballantine presided, and a distinguished company from the bench and bar were present. Mr. Justice Lopes will be entertained at dinner by the past and present members of the Western Circuit bar mess on Saturday, February 3, at the Albion, Aldersgate, in honour of his elevation to the bench.

An opinion has recently been given by Mr. Danby P. Fry, Assistant-Secretary of the Local Government Board, as to the meaning of the 23rd section of the Poor Law Amendment Act, which relates to friendly societies. In the case of members of friendly societies who, becoming lunatics, are sent to a lunatic asylum, and are there chargeable to the rates, the 23rd section provides that poor law guardians "may" reimburse themselves out of the sick pay which would be due to the lunatics as members of such societies. At a great meeting of members of friendly societies, held in Sheffield in November last to consider this section, Mr. Mundella, M.P., who presided, contended that the word "may" meant "shall"; that the guardians, therefore, had no option in the matter, and were bound to require the trustees of friendly societies to pay over to them the sick pay, whether the families of the lunatics were in distress or not. This view of the case was objected to by Mr. Robertshaw, a poor law guardian and a prominent member of friendly societies, who urged that the word "may" gave guardians a discretionary power. Recently the Sheffield Board of Guardians communicated with the Local Government Board with the view of ascertaining whether the section gave them a discretionary power or not. In reply, Mr. Danby P. Fry writes, "that the section has no effect until the relief granted to a pauper lunatic has been declared to be a loan; consequently, the guardians have the usual discretion in granting relief to decide whether, in cases applicable to the statute, they shall declare it to be a loan or not." [We should have thought this tolerably clear on the statute.]

At a moot held on Wednesday evening in Gray's-inn Hall, before Mr. John Rose, barrister, president, the following point was argued:—"A murder having been committed, a reward was offered for the detection of the murderer. A., to gain the reward, accused B., an innocent man, and caused him to be apprehended and tried for the murder. At the trial A., giving evidence for the prosecution, falsely and corruptly swore that B. committed the crime, whereupon the accused was legally convicted and hanged. On these facts could an indictment against A. for the murder of B. be maintained in law?" For the prosecution, Mr. Lush and Mr. Simon maintained that a philosopher or a statesman would consider A.'s crime murder. His evidence robbed his victim of life and reputation together. If the law was as it should be, it was murder to do so. It is murder in other countries and

by the Roman law. A man may kill another by words producing acts of others. In answer to the court, counsel distinguished A.'s crime from the lying of Iago. Mr. Mattinson and Mr. V. Brown, for the prisoner, contended that whatever A.'s moral guilt was he was not technically guilty of wilful murder. There had been no such charge for 120 years. It might have been anciently murder, but it was not now held to be so. Lord Coke was with them, and even Titus Oates was only indicted for perjury. The same view was taken in *Reg.* v. *Daniel* and by Foster. There was no malice here, either at law or in fact, and the offence was only a misdemeanour. The president said that the law implies malice from homicide. B. was certainly killed by A. The case was analogous to that of a man who constrained another to start a dangerous engine, knowing that another is within it, and the last is killed in consequence. He entertained no doubt that in a real court a judge would hold this to be "murder."

MR. DANIEL, Q.C., ON THE EXTENSION OF COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION.

At the annual *soiree* of the Bradford Chamber of Commerce on Monday last Mr. Daniel, Q.C., judge of county courts, said he had been asked to bring before the notice of the chamber the question of the extension of county court jurisdiction. They would be aware, probably, that this question was dealt with favourably in the second report of the Judicature Commission. They would be aware, also, that the questions of tribunals of commerce had created great interest in Bradford, and that a committee of the House of Commons had reported in favour of such tribunals of commerce, and that he was examined before that committee. What he then said he adhered to now. The report of the committee led to the issuing by the Government of a supplementary commission specially to inquire into the question of the expediency of establishing tribunals of commerce. A large amount of evidence was taken by that commission, and the whole of that evidence was published. The result of the inquiry was that a report was signed by twenty-seven out of the twenty-nine commissioners against the establishment of tribunals of commerce, and that report was the third report of the Judicature Commission. The report, however, contained on the face of it an admission that the complaints of the mercantile portion of the community as to the cost and delay attending on the trial of these causes were well founded, but the commission hoped and believed that with the improved administration of the Judicature Act, coupled with that extended jurisdiction which was recommended in the second report of the commission, the object desired by those who advocated tribunals of commerce would be substantially effected. Well, the Judicature Act was passed, and had now been in operation twelve months. He had no right to claim to be a prophet; but he did think—and he expressed his opinion at the time—that the effect of the operation of the Judicature Act would be, in proportion as it facilitated the hearing of cases on their merits, doing away with all unnecessary proceedings and all technicalities, to produce such a block of business in London that the courts could not get through their work. That opinion had been verified by the result. The second sittings under the new Act had just commenced, and from a legal periodical he saw that in what were called the common law divisions of the High Court of Justice, *i.e.*, the Queen's Bench, the Common Pleas, and the Exchequer Divisions, there were 1,300 cases remaining for hearing and argument, while in the Court of Chancery there were between 600 and 700 cases, and that the number had doubled within two years. To his mind this state of affairs proved beyond all question that what was wanted was not concentration in London, but distribution throughout the country. But in London they could not trust provincial courts. They had an opinion that the local judge must in some way be infected by the influences which surrounded him; that he could not dine with a nobleman, or accept the hospitality of a merchant prince, without being subject to some illegitimate influence. Now, he said to such people, "Come and see." His object was, if he could, to get rid of that block of business in London. London lawyers were urging the appointment of more judges. Well, let them appoint more judges. The last request that was made on that subject had been made by a friend of his, Mr. Osborne Morgan, who suggested that there should be two more chancery judges. An exactly similar request or recommendation, was made by the Chancery Commissioners in their report of 1851, on which report the Act of 1852 was founded. Now, to appoint two additional judges at the present time would, in his humble opinion, be a very inefficient mode of remedying the evil. Let him give a practical instance of how it would act. On Friday morning he had had occasion to view some machinery in connection with an action. There were two gentlemen with him, and one of them said that he was engaged in a Bradford action which was being tried in Middlesex—and which, by-the-by, ought to be tried here—and that some weeks before the briefs had been delivered to the barristers, and on inquiry on Friday he was told that his case stood 509 on the Middlesex list. Now, in consequence of Easter falling early this year—public convenience requiring that the assizes should finish before Good Friday—the judges intended to commence their circuits on the 15th of February. That left the judges one calendar month, during which period alone they had the means of sitting in London to dispose of the enormous arrears of cases of which he had given them an idea. One suggestion as to a mode of carrying into effect, not only the suggestion of the county court judges, but the recommendation of the Judicature Commission, as a means of remedying the evil was to give unlimited jurisdiction to county courts throughout the whole country. This suggestion had been proposed and carefully drawn up by Mr. Harrington, the county court judge of the agricultural portion of Northamptonshire and Warwickshire, who had elaborated the proposal with great care and had estimated the expenses. The objection to this scheme was that the requirements of the different parts of the country were not the same—that they did not require the same kind of courts in the agricultural districts as they required in the great commercial centres of Yorkshire and Lancashire; that in the latter far more important and complicated questions were raised. Besides that, there was the objection that every county court judge was not equal to the work. Then, there was another suggestion as to the mode of meeting the evil for which he (the speaker) considered himself responsible. He had been asked to meet a deputation of representatives of chambers of commerce for the purpose of considering the advisability of introducing into a Bill a provision enabling the Queen, by an Order in Council, upon the petition of a municipal body representing a town or city with, say, over 50,000 inhabitants, to grant to the county court of that district unlimited jurisdiction. It seemed to him that that was a mode of getting rid of the difficulty arising from the supposed incompetency of some of the courts to exercise such an extended jurisdiction, because he was quite sure that the municipal body of such a town would not ask for extended jurisdiction unless they were satisfied with the existing arrangements. At any rate, such a municipal body would not ask for an extension unless they were satisfied that the interests of the public would be promoted by the extension. The objection to this arrangement was that it depended on any town having for the time an efficient registrar or an efficient judge, and that either the one or the other might retire or die, and an inefficient one might succeed. He had had that objection put to him by an ex-Lord Chancellor, Lord Selborne. His reply to the objection simply was, that it was the duty of the Lord Chancellor to see that a good man was appointed, and that he should not be influenced by political partisanship or by personal friendship, but by the fitness of the man for the place. That scheme, however, was never brought forward. Another measure had been prepared by a county court judge, who had previously had the experience of a secretary to the Judicature Commission. The object of his Bill, which he (Mr. Daniel) had studied, was to create certain principal centres in various parts of the country, to which should be attached judges of higher standing than the ordinary county court judges, who should be resident, and who should have unlimited jurisdiction on all matters that came under the cognizance of the higher court, with power of removal in fitting cases. Lancashire was one principal

centre, with Liverpool and Manchester as capitals, and joining with Lancashire, Cumberland, and Westmoreland, giving three judges to the centre. Northumberland and Durham constituted another centre, with Newcastle as the capital, and with one judge. For Yorkshire two judges were proposed, with Leeds and Bradford as the principal towns, though, of course, any place might be made a chief town which the Lord Chancellor might at any time think desirable. The Midland districts constituted another centre, with Birmingham as the capital, and the South-western counties another centre, with Bristol as the principal place. Power was given to the Queen by an Order in Council to make other centres whenever it should be thought necessary. The ordinary business which now blocked the London courts would be all transacted at these centres. Whether such a scheme as this were adopted or not, he believed that experience would very shortly show that the attempt that was being made to force all these omnibuses through Temple Bar would not succeed. So far as administration was concerned, he felt sure that distribution would be the principle that would have to be adopted, while, so far as the settlement of the law was concerned, concentration was the principle to be adopted—an easy means of appeal from the provincial to the superior courts. The Bill which he had described was being prepared under the auspices of the Newcastle Chamber of Commerce, with the assistance of Mr. Cowen, one of the members for Newcastle, who had expressed his willingness and determination to introduce a Bill into the House of Commons. He (Mr. Daniel) hoped that such a Bill would have the support of the other chambers of commerce throughout the country. He had been requested also to say a few words as to the law of bankruptcy. They would know that a Bill on the subject had been introduced during the past session of Parliament by the Lord Chancellor, but had been withdrawn. He did not know whether the same Bill would be brought forward again, and it was not of course for him to express an opinion. They would be aware, however, that the Lord Chancellor had appointed a committee to report to him with reference to the working of the bankruptcy laws, and the result of the inquiries of that committee had been to show the unfavourable working of the present bankruptcy laws in reference to the cost. The comptroller, Mr. Mansfield Parkins, who was a member of that committee, had, indeed, added a report of his own in which he very strongly recommended the abolition of the present system of management by creditors, and a return to the system of official management. How far any new legislation would assume the character of a return to the official system he had no means of knowing, and he would not hazard a conjecture. But this he must say, that as far as his experience went, creditors were much too remiss in looking after their own interests. He confessed when he saw this—and he had expressed the opinion before and had given his reasons for holding it—he should like to see the present system, so far as it enabled a debtor to come to court when he found that he was insolvent, to be continued in this way, that instead of allowing the debtor to file a petition for liquidation and then, by means of such assistance as he could get from accountants and solicitors and proxies, secure the management in his own hands, that a debtor when he presented his petition to the court should accompany that petition by a statement of his debts, an estimate of his assets, and a list of his creditors, and that he should verify this statement on oath; that then the court, by its own proper officers, should itself appoint a day and a place for the meeting of the creditors, a day and a place, of course, selected with a view to the convenience of the great body of the creditors; that, having so appointed a place and a day, notice should be sent to every creditor, with the information that he could have a copy of the debtor's list of debts, assets, and names of creditors on payment of a small charge to cover the cost of copying the list, so that before the day of meeting every creditor might have the means of knowing the whole extent of the debtor's assets, the amount of his liabilities, and might in that way have an opportunity of making inquiries. He would further suggest that when a debtor intended to offer a composition he should accompany his statement of assets, &c., with that offer, and that it should be submitted to the creditors in order that they might know before the meeting what they ought to know as to the debtor's position and what he proposed to offer them. At such a meeting, held before an officer of the court who should be empowered to control the proceedings and to maintain order and regularity—for he heard that many creditors' meetings were little better than bear-gardens — he thought much might be done to prevent those miscarriages which now too frequently took place at meetings of creditors, where debtors got resolutions passed accepting compositions. If that were done he thought many of the present objections to the system of compositions would be removed. There was this fact in reference to the returns as to these compositions—that the number of them was increasing while the average amount of the compositions was decreasing. The existing law as to fraudulent preferences was about as bad as it could be; it enabled any man who knew that he was insolvent, if he only took care to keep that knowledge to himself, to realize all his assets, to pay in full such creditors as he thought it would be his interest to make friends of, by that means to reduce his assets to just sufficient to pay the expenses of a liquidation, and then to leave the great body of his creditors without a penny. In his opinion the law ought to try to touch the consciences of the creditors, and to make them know that they had no right to take 20s. in the pound at the expense of the other creditors. Mr. Daniel, after alluding to the necessity that the law should do something to check the system of gambling which had lately shown itself in connection with many of our commercial transactions, expressed the hope that the time would soon come when suitors would be able to get their disputes settled at a reasonable cost and with a reasonable amount of delay, and his belief that that could only be done by the extension of the jurisdiction of the local courts.

THE CHANCERY BLOCK.

MR. FREELING writes to the *Times*:—It does not appear to me that any real answer has been given to Mr. Kekewich's questions, and I doubt whether any answer perfectly satisfactory can be given except by some of the solicitors whose practice in the Chancery Division is extensive.

In the meantime I venture, for the information of the public, to put down some few instances, which in my own experience I have met with, of the difficulties which arise from the want of judicial power in the Chancery Division. I abstain, of course, from particularizing, as it might seem invidious to specify courts or individuals.

I find that the block in the Chancery Division is discernible in every one of its departments. In the courts themselves the list of causes which appears at the commencement of our legal year is not unfrequently undisposed of in part at the end of that year, involving, as your readers will perceive, the lapse of more than a year between the setting down and the hearing of a cause. But this is not all; for motions and petitions, which are usually pressing matters, are, owing to the press of business, postponed from time to time, so that in some instances they are months in arrear, the judge being physically unable to cope with the amount of work before him.

But, suppose the decree or order pronounced, it has to be drawn up, and for this purpose must pass through the registrar's office. Here there is another block. There is not a prospect of getting an important decree through the office under many weeks, as the case must wait its turn before the registrar can give his attention to it; and even the more simple and pressing orders require a week or ten days to pass them. It is singular that the additional pressure of business should have been met by the suppression of the office of one of the registrars whose assistance is so much needed.

Another block is in chambers, and the extent of its operation varies in the different courts. I know that an appointment, which formerly could have been obtained in forty-eight hours, now requires from four days to a week. The greatest difficulty, however, is experienced in complicated cases. The chief clerk makes an appointment for some day, probably far off; but when the appointment has to be attended, he cannot, owing to the pressure of business, give more than about an hour to the consideration of the case, and even that time is not free from interruptions. The matter is then adjourned, and when it comes on again after the lapse, perhaps, of a month or two, much of what had been done before has naturally passed from the mind of the chief clerk, and a

good deal of the old ground has to be gone over again. I have known cases in which all kinds of expedients have been resorted to by the parties tired with the protracted course of business in chambers.

No one who, like myself, has watched with interest the progress of the new system can fail to regret that its full success should be marred by the insufficiency of the judicial power. All the strenuous exertions of the present staff of judges and of their officers, aided as they are by the cordial assistance of both branches of the profession, fail to make an adequate impression on the mass of business which now incumbers the Chancery Division.

Vice-Chancellor Malins stated on Wednesday that all causes in his court were disposed of up to the end of January, 1875. The following had been set down for hearing since that time —viz., one in February, 1875; three in July, 1875; five in January, 1876; two in February, 1876; five in March, 1876; two in April, 1876; eighteen in May, 1876; ten in June, 1876; eight in July, 1876; thirteen in August, 1876; two in September, 1876; seven in October, 1876; eighteen in November, 1876; twenty-nine in December, 1876; and four in January, 1877. Many of the earlier ones in that list were either standing over or unprepared for hearing. His lordship remarked that the length of time already occupied by the case now before the court was a forcible commentary on that list of causes and the amount of business done by this court, which, taking into consideration the interlocutory applications, had practically only three days in the week for hearing causes.

THE FULL COURT OF DIVORCE.

A CORRESPONDENT of a local contemporary says:—It has been ruled, it appears, in the new appellate court that appeals do not lie to it from the judgments of the judge ordinary of the Divorce Court; the consequence is that from decisions by a single judge at once affecting character and the dearest interests of domestic life, the only appeal continues to be to what is called the full court, wherein for the most part the same judge presides—the court also being constituted by him and two other judges "called in to assist him." Such is the estimate of their relation to him as expressed by one of themselves. Further, it is notorious that with the exacting engagements of our judges in their own courts, it is a scramble to enlist two of them for this adjutant service in a strange court; so that sometimes, and at the last moment, the announcement of the sittings of the full court has to be revoked by advertisement. . . .

What renders the scandal the more extraordinary is the consideration that it is suffered to continue in the face of our two latest enactments, as follows, concerning appellate tribunals:—

"No member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is to take part in the hearing of an appeal from any decision or judgment which he has given, or assisted in giving."

"No judge of the Court of Appeal shall sit as a judge on the hearing of an appeal from any judgment or order made by himself, or made by any divisional court of the High Court of which he was and is a member."

That after these enactments, especially the latter, so careful in its restrictions, the anomalous character of appeals in the Divorce Court should be maintained, argues little carefulness for the administration of justice in that quarter, albeit therein, from time to time, the most delicate equities have to be determined. It is as though the unhappy suitors in that court were not deemed worthy of the cautious adjudication of their interests which is observed in all our other courts.

On this subject the organs of the legal profession are silent. But it is of such general concernment to the whole community that perhaps the press generally is the most suitable channel for its ventilation; and if the Lord Chancellor's attention becomes arrested to it, it may be hoped that, in the next session of Parliament, the anomaly will be corrected.

Courts.

HIGH COURT.

CHANCERY DIVISION.

(Before the MASTER OF THE ROLLS.)

Jan. 11.—*In re Joyce.*

Articled clerk—Service under a solicitor.

Fischer, Q.C. (*Owen* with him), applied on behalf of John Gardner Joyce, an articled clerk, for an order to enable him to pass his final examination and be admitted a solicitor.

In May, 1875, in order to complete his term of service, Joyce, who had for ten years been managing clerk to a solicitor now dead, had entered into articles with a solicitor named Stirke; but the Incorporated Law Society objected that Joyce had not really acted as the servant or clerk of Stirke under those articles as required by the statute. The chief grounds of the objection were that the offices were Joyce's, and his name as well as Stirke's was painted over the door, that the banking account was kept in Joyce's name, and the cheques were drawn by him alone, and that no accounts had been rendered to Stirke of the profits of the business, and there was nothing, it was alleged, to show that he had acted as the agent of Stirke. These facts were admitted; but in explanation of them it was stated that Stirke properly attended every day to the business and had some clients of his own; but the greater number of clients were either Joyce's personal friends or old clients of Traill, a deceased solicitor to whom Joyce had been for several years managing clerk, and that these persons wished Joyce to continue to conduct their affairs, and for that purpose they had transferred their business to Stirke by a written retainer, and that Joyce's sole object had been to keep this business together until he could be admitted. On the third point Stirke and Joyce being examined, both deposed that the agreement was that Joyce should have a yearly salary of £150, and that the accounts were to be made up when Joyce was admitted, and the balance, after deducting the salary, was to belong to Stirke or to form a fund for a partnership.

Cookson, Q.C., and *Murray*, appeared for the Incorporated Law Society.

JESSEL, M.R., said:—Here is a young man evidently intelligent, who, however, probably did not know as much as he knows now, for if he had put this agreement in writing he would have had none of this trouble. I am not aware of any objection to these terms; I am to have a salary, and will pay you the profits, and when I am admitted you agree not to take away those clients. Nor is it different if it is agreed that the capital is to form a fund to be put into a partnership; this is sworn to by Joyce and Stirke. As regards actual service, all that the law requires is service, i.e., attendance at the office; it does not require that the master should know more than the clerk. It often happens that a clerk has had many more years' experience, and knows far more, than his master. Joyce has complied with the law, and I am of opinion that he intended to comply with it, that he intended to serve under a solicitor, and so to qualify himself to become a solicitor. Therefore I will grant the application, but under the circumstances, seeing that it was, in my opinion, a proper case for inquiry on the part of the Law Society, I shall depart from my ordinary rule, and make no order as to costs.

[Note.—Compare *In re J. Smith*, *In re Mills*, and *In re Duncan*, 12 W. R. 752.]

COUNTY COURTS.

WORKSOP.

(Before R. WILDMAN, Esq., Judge.)

Jan. 13.—*Drury* v. *Towne.*

Landlord and tenant — Tenancy for six months certain — Assignee of reversion.

By an agreement dated January 5, 1876, Wm. Middleton let a shop and dwelling-house in Bridge-street, Worksop, to defendant for "six months certain," from March 25, 1876, at the yearly rent of £62.

On April 25, 1876, Middleton sold and conveyed the shop and dwelling-house to plaintiff. The defendant duly occupied under the agreement until September 29, 1876, when he gave up possession to plaintiff, and at the same time tendered him £31 as the amount of rent then due. This plaintiff declined to accept, and ultimately sued defendant for £28 12s. 3d. for six months' use and occupation of the premises from March 25 to September 9, and £3 11s. 6d. for the three weeks from September 9 to September 29, during which defendant, as plaintiff alleged, had overheld possession.

The above facts were proved at the hearing.

Bescoly, for the defendant, then submitted—(1) That the conveyance to the plaintiff having been made since the agreement for tenancy and the commencement of the term, the plaintiff was not entitled to sue for use and occupation, and cited *Churchward* v. *Ford*, 2 H. & N. 446. (2) That in the present case "six months" must be taken as meaning the usual half-yearly period from the 25th of March to the 29th of September.

Coulson, for the plaintiff, contended that *Churchward* v. *Ford* did not apply. In the case of a lease, not under seal, for a fixed term, the assignee of the reversion is entitled to sue *in assumpsit* for use and occupation: *Standen* v. *Christmas*, 10 Q. B. 135. "Six months" means "six lunar months": *Rogers* v. *Hull Dock Company*, 12 W. R. 1101.

His HONOUR held that the plaintiff, as owner of the reversion, was entitled to sue, and that the "six months certain" mentioned in the agreement must be taken as lunar months, and accordingly gave judgment for the full amount claimed by the plaintiff, with costs.

Law Students' Journal.

COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION.

HILARY EXAMINATION, 1877.

GENERAL EXAMINATION of STUDENTS of the INNS of COURT, held at Lincoln's-inn Hall, on the 29th and 30th of December, 1876, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of January, 1877.

The Council of Legal Education have awarded to Edward Harper Parker, of the Middle Temple, and Charles Alfred Russell, of Gray's-inn, Esqs., studentships in jurisprudence and Roman civil law, of one hundred guineas, to continue for a period of two years; to Thomas Turquand Fillan, of the Middle Temple, and John Greenwood Shipman, of the Inner Temple, Esqs., studentships in jurisprudence and Roman civil law, of one hundred guineas, for one year; and to John Pickersgill Rodger, of the Inner Temple, Esq., a certificate of honour of the second class.

The council have also awarded to the following students certificates that they have satisfactorily passed a public examination:—Henry Adkins, William Allison, Thomas Newman Frederick Bardwell, William Henry Archibald Christie-Miller, Hendrik Cloete, Francis Ernest Colenso, James Dominick Daly, John Martin Danavall, William Pinder Eversley, Julian Francis Harper, John Heywood, Robert Alexander Milligan Hogg, Marie Louis Alexandre Hugues, Lancelot Edward Lawford, Ernest Beauchamp Nelson, Goddard Henry Orpen, Arthur Bruce Smith, Frank Lea Stourbridge Smyth, Henry Goulburn Chetwynd Stapylton, Henry Hatchell Warren, George Meryon White, and Augustine Robert Whiteway, of the Inner Temple; William Henry Barlow, James Blenkinsop, Alfred De Bathe Brandon, David Archer Vaughan Colt-Williams, Corrie Brighton Grant, Eugenius Charles Jackson, Gaupat Sarrottam Mankar, John Gold Philpot, David Rodger, and Purna Chundia Sen, of the Middle Temple; and Richard Booth, William Henry Crane, Urquhart Atwell Forbes, John Robert Freeman, Arthur Ryle Harding, William James Wright Ingham, Alexander Chalmers Marshall, Reginald Merivale, Edward Robert Pearce, Frederick James Norman Pearson, Charles Swann Sheild, Henry Stanton, Arthur Stephen Thornton, Swinford Leslie Thornton, Arthur Alliott Wells, Thomas Cyprian Williams, and Henry George Willink, of Lincoln's-inn, Esqs.

The following students passed a satisfactory examination in Roman civil law only:—J. L. W. Andrews, V. S. Brown, A. J. Burney, A. K. Butterworth, A. R. Butterworth, R. Butler, W. P. Cobbett, F. H Dawkins, J. W. Evans, J. W. C. Fraser, W. C. Ghose, R. Gregorowski, A. R. Grubbe, H. W. Hart, A. G. Hipwell, A. W. S. Hitchman, C. R. Hoffmeister, L. C. d'A. Lipscombe, E. W. Mauson, E. J. Mack, W. D. McConkey, W. A. Milner, W. Mills, A. H. Page, A. J. Parker, C. Peill, A. A. Prankerd, H. G. Rawson, G. B. Richardson, W. H. Roberts, H. Rushworth, H. A. Smith, W. H. Spackman, T. F. Squarey, P. F. S. Stokes, J. Turner, W. M. K. Vale, J. C. Wall, J. L. Walton, and E. S. Wilkins, Esqs.

By Order of the Council,
(Signed) S. H. WALPOLE, Chairman.
Council Chamber, Lincoln's-inn, Jan. 10.

DECEMBER EXAMINATION, 1876.

On the SUBJECTS of the LECTURES of the PROFESSORS of the INNS of COURT, held at Lincoln's-inn Hall, on the 18th and 19th of December, 1876.

The Council of Legal Education have awarded the following prizes to the under-mentioned students:—

Jurisprudence, Roman Law, International Law, and Constitutional Law and Legal History.—Charles Alfred Russell, of Gray's-inn, a prize of £50; Thomas Turquand Fillan, of the Middle Temple, a prize of £15; Reinhold Gregorowski, of Gray's-inn, a prize of £10.

Equity.—Nathaniel Spencer, of the Middle Temple, a prize of £50; William George Thorpe, of the Middle Temple, a prize of £15.

Common Law.—Thomas Francis Byrne, of the Middle Temple, and John Lawson Walton, of the Inner Temple, a prize of £37 10s. each (equal); Seymour Bushe, of the Inner Temple, and Vincent Brown, of Gray's-inn, a prize of £12 10s. each (equal).

Real and Personal Property Law.—Thomas Clarkson, of Lincoln's-inn, a prize of £50; James Lawrence Carew, of the Middle Temple, a prize of £25; James Power Everard, of the Middle Temple, a prize of £15.

The council have also awarded to the student who obtained the greatest aggregate number of marks in the subjects of the lectures given by two of the professors—viz., in jurisprudence, Roman law, international law, and constitutional law and legal history, and common law, Edward Harper Parker, of the Middle Temple—a prize of £30.

By order of the Council,
(Signed) S. H. WALPOLE, Chairman.
Council Chamber, Lincoln's-inn, Jan. 10.

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.

The following are lists of the candidates who have passed the recent LL.B. examinations:—First LL.B. Examination.—First division—Giles Andrew, private study; William Frederick Hamilton, private study; Arthur Oldham Jennings, private study; Frederick Charles Kolbe, B.A., University College; John William Piercy, private study; Archibald Arthur Prankerd, B.A., Worcester College, Oxford; Charles Alfred Russell, B.A., Gray's-inn and University College; Henry Arthur Smith, M.A., private study; William John Sparrow, B.A., private study; Francis William Steere, private study; Philip Folliott Scott Stokes, B.A., private study; Stephen Horton Williamson, private tuition; John Kyme Wright, University College and private tuition and study; Howard Young, private study. Second division—John Holden Clarke, Owens College; Eustace Conway, private study; Charles Johnston Edwards, private study; Hugh William Elcum, University College and private study; John William Evans, University College; Percy Ralph Evans, private study; Charles Henry Ernest Fletcher, private study; Frederick Joseph Mogg Gould, private study; Frederick Kilvington, private tuition; Walter Mills, Dursley Grammar School; John Ernest Moore, private tuition; Francis Robert Morrison, private study; William Percy Pain, private study; Dudley Stewart Smith, private study; William Henry Taylor, private study. Second LL.B. Examination.—First division—Clement Meacher Bailhache, private study; Robert Frederick Norton, B.A., private study. Second division—Herbert Bentwich,

University College; Henry Alleyne Bovell, University College; Fielding Clarke, private study; Herbert Henry Cooper, private study; George Sydney Davies, private study; Angus George Milward M'Intyre, private study; John Frank Rowe, private study; James Walmesley, University College and private tuition.

Court Papers.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

ORDER OF BUSINESS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Mondays and Thursdays, motions and new trials; Tuesdays and Fridays, special paper; Wednesdays, cases from inferior courts; Saturdays, Crown paper and cases from inferior courts. Every afternoon, by three o'clock, a list will be posted of the cases in the paper intended to be taken on the following day.

APPEALS FROM INFERIOR COURTS.

The present list will be divided into three. The first 26 cases will be taken in the Queen's Bench Division, the second 26 cases will be taken in the Common Pleas, and the remainder in the Exchequer. For the future the cases will be set down for the three divisions in rotation.

The list in the Queen's Bench will be taken on Wednesdays and Saturdays, in the Common Pleas on Mondays and Thursdays, in the Exchequer on Tuesdays and Fridays.

PUBLIC COMPANIES.

January 19, 1877.

GOVERNMENT FUNDS.

3 per Cent. Consols, 95⅞	Annuities, April, '85, 9⅛
Ditto for Account, Feb. 1, 95⅞	Do. (Red Sea T.) Aug. 1908
Do. 3 per Cent. Reduced, 95⅞	Ex Bills, £1000, 2½ per Ct. 27 pm
New 3 per Cent., 95⅝	Ditto, £500, Do, 27 pm.
Do. 3½ per Cent., Jan. '94	Ditto, £100 & £200, 27 pm.
Do. 2½ per Cent., Jan. '94	Bank of England Stock, — per Ct. (last half-year), 269
Do. 5 per Cent., Jan. '73	Ditto for Account.
Annuities, Jan. '80	

INDIAN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

Ditto 5 per Cent., July, '80, 105½xd	Ditto, 5½ per Cnt., May, '79, 91
Ditto for Account, —	Ditto Debentures, 4 per Cents. April, '64
Ditto 4 per Cent., Oct. '88, 104¼	Do. Do. 5 per Cent., Aug. '73
Ditto, ditto, Certificates —	Do. Bonds, 4 per Cent. £1000
Ditto Enfaced Ppr., 4 per Cent. 88	Ditto, ditto, under £1000
2nd Enf. Pr., 5 per C., Jan. '72	

RAILWAY STOCK.

	Railways.	Paid.	Closing Prices
Stock	Bristol and Exeter	100	—
Stock	Caledonian	100	122⅝
Stock	Glasgow and South-Western	100	106
Stock	Great Eastern Ordinary Stock	100	49
Stock	Great Northern	100	132
Stock	Do., A Stock*	100	133½
Stock	Great Southern and Western of Ireland	100	—
Stock	Great Western—Original	100	103⅝
Stock	Lancashire and Yorkshire	100	138
Stock	London, Brighton, and South Coast	100	119½
Stock	London, Chatham, and Dover	100	21
Stock	London and North-Western	100	146⅝
Stock	London and South Western	100	128½
Stock	Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincoln	100	72
Stock	Metropolitan	100	105½
Stock	Do., District	100	45⅝
Stock	Midland	100	126
Stock	North British	100	107⅛
Stock	North Eastern	100	154⅛
Stock	North London	100	137
Stock	North Staffordshire	100	67
Stock	South Devon	100	69
Stock	South-Eastern	100	127

*A receives no dividend until 6 per cent. has been paid to B.

MARRIAGES AND DEATHS.

MARRIAGES.

SHELLY—SHANKS—Jan. 16, at Ilfracombe, John Shelly, of Plymouth, solicitor, to Eliza Sophia, daughter of the late Thomas Shanks, R.N.

SOULSBY—HILDYARD—Jan. 18, at St. Andrew's, Holborn, William Jameson Soulsby, of the Middle Temple, barrister-at-law, to Clara, daughter of George Augustus Hildyard.

WILSON—WILSON—Jan. 10, at St. John the Baptist, Kingston-vale, John James Wilson, barrister-at-law, to Mary Annie, daughter of the late John Rawshorne Wilson.

DEATHS.

BOYER—Jan. 14, Richard Boyer, of 14, Old Jewry-chambers, and Highbury, aged 50.

COLLINSON—Jan. 13, at 7, Devonshire-place, Portland-place, W., Henry Collinson, of the Inner Temple, aged 65.

GAYER—Jan. 12, at Abbotsleigh, Upper Norwood, Arthur Edward Gayer, Q.C., LL.D., late one of H.M. Ecclesiastical Commissioners for Ireland, and Chancellor and Vicar-General of the dioceses of Meath, Ossory, and Cashel, aged 75.

LONDON GAZETTES.

Professional Partnerships Dissolved.

FRIDAY, Jan. 12, 1877.

Keighley, John Norman, and Henry Gething, 7, Ironmonger lane London, Solicitors. Jan 1

TUESDAY, Jan. 16, 1877.

Bradshaw, Robert Bateson Dixon, and Henry Garencieres Pearson, Fisher's buildings, Strand, Barrow-in-Furness, Lancashire, Solicitors. Jan 10

Winding up of Joint Stock Companies.

FRIDAY, Jan. 12, 1877.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

English Channel Steamship Company, Limited.—V.C. Malins has, by an order dated Dec 18, appointed Frederick Whinney, Old Jewry, and John Earle Hodges, Abchurch lane, to be the official liquidators. Creditors are required, on or bef re Feb 3, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to the above. Wednesday, Feb 14, at 12, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims

North London and Suburban Skating Rink Company, Limited.—The M.R. has fixed Tuesday, Jan 23, at 12, at his chambers, as the time and place for the appointment of an official liquidator

Original Hartlepool Collieries Company, Limited.—Petition for winding up, presented Jan 5, directed to be heard before V.C. Malins, and not before the M R. (as previously advertized) on Jan 19. Harcourt and Macarthur, Moorgate st, solicitors for the petitioners

TUESDAY, Jan. 16, 1877.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

Kermoor Fisheries and Reservoirs Company, Limited.—Petition for winding up, presented Jan 11, directed to be heard before V.C. Hall on Jan 26. Campbell and Co, Warwick st, Regent st, solicitors for the petitioners

Mostyn Silver Lead and Blende Company, Limited.—The M.R. has fixed Thursday, Jan 25, at 12, at his chambers, as the time and place for the appointment of an official liquidator

Positive Government Security Life Assurance Company, Limited.—Petition for winding up, presented Jan 9, directed to be heard before V.C. Malins on Jan 26. Philp, Budge row, Cannon st, solicitor for the petitioner

Profit Union, Limited.—Petition for winding up, presented Jan 12, directed to be heard before V.C. Hall on Jan 26. Musgrave, Albert buildings, Queen Victoria st, solicitor for the petitioner

Ruby Consolidated Mining Company, Limited.—Petition for winding up, presented Jan 13, directed to be heard before V.C. Bacon on Jan 27. Girdlestone, Albany courtyard, Piccadilly, solicitor for the petitioner

Standfield's Patent Cab Company, Limited.—V.C. Bacon has fixed Jan 25, at 12, at his chambers, as the time and place for the appointment of an official liquidator

COUNTY PALATINE OF LANCASTER.

Pendleton Machine Company, Limited.—Petition for winding up, presented Jan 8, directed to be heard before the V.C. on Tuesday, Jan 23, at 3.30. Ramwell and Co, Manchester, solicitors for the petitioners

Friendly Societies Dissolved.

TUESDAY, Jan. 16, 1877.

Labourers' Accident and Burial Society, Coach and Horses Inn, Stillhouse lane, Birmingham. Jan 11

St. Columb New Friendly Society, New Inn, St. Columb Major, Cornwall. Jan 12

Wilne and Draycott Female Benefit Society, Coach and Horses Inn, Draycott, Derby. Jan 13

Creditors under Estates in Chancery.

Last Day of Proof.

FRIDAY, Jan. 12, 1877.

Strong, Catherine Elizabeth, Eastbourne, Sussex. Feb 10. Strong v Strong, V.C. Malins. Ram, Red Lion sq

TUESDAY, Jan. 16, 1877.

Barnes, Francis Kentucky, Bristol, Merchant. Feb 19. Barnes v Barnes, V.C. Malins. Harwood, Bristol
Hyeh, William James, Essex rd, Islington, Bookseller. Feb 7. Ensworth v Abbey, V.C. Hall. Jourdain, Ludgate hill
Jones, John, Neath, Glamorgan, Tinman. Feb 27. Jones v Shilling. District Registrar, Fisher st, Swansea. Leyson, Swansea
Reeves, Samuel, Richmond grove, Barnsbury, Printer. Feb 1. Reeves v Reeves, V.C. Malins. Roxworthy, Cheapside
Ungley, William, Baynes row, Clerkenwell, Wire Contractor. Feb 15. Ungley v Ungley, V.C. Malins. Rooks, King st, Cheapside

Creditors under 22 & 23 Vict. cap. 35.

Last Day of Claim.

FRIDAY, Jan. 5, 1877.

Ashby, Edward, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Baker. Feb 24. Gardiner and Co, Uxbridge
Aspinall, Martha, Liverpool, Licensed Victualler. March 1. Norris and Sons, Liverpool
Berriman, Lewis Arthur, Holywell, Flint, Licensed Victualler. Jan 31. Barrell and Rodway, Liverpool
Carlile, Hester Elizabeth, Clifton, Bristol. March 1. Fry and Co, Bristol
Cawthron, William, Frankwell, Shrewsbury, Salop, Painter. March 5. Craigs, Shrewsbury
Coe, Louisa, Sudbury, Suffolk, Corn Dealer. Feb 14. Andrewes and Co, Sudbury
Costelloe, Mary Theresa, Westmoreland-rd, Bayswater. Feb 2. Thomson and Co, Great James-st, Bedford-row
Coupland, Harriet, Scarborough, York. Feb 1. Christie, Lothbury
Dunn, Charles Birtill, Clifton, Bristol, Gent. March 1. Brittan and Co, Bristol
Duprey, Henry, Woodbury-down, Stoke Newington, Gent. Feb 14. Jackson and Ellen, Chancery-lane
Enderby, William, Beckington, Somerset, Esq. Feb 5. Johnson and Co, Austin-friars
Greenwood, Thomas, Sandfield Lodge, Hampstead, Esq. Feb 28. Paine and Co, Gresham House
Harriss, William Thomas Oliver, Dempsey-st, Mile End, Gent. Feb 3. Pearce and Son, Gilt-spur-st
Hoskyns, Chandos Wren, Harewood, Hereford, Esq. Feb 16. Domville and Co, New-sq, Lincoln's-inn
Jones, Hannah, Carnarvon. Feb 10. Turner and Allanson, Carnarvon
Leighton, George, Osgodby, York, Farmer. March 8. Moody and Co, Scarborough
Mawson, John, Holbeck, Leeds. Feb 16. Middleton and Sons, Leeds
Oldroyd, Mark, Overton Hall, York, Gent. March 1. Scholefield and Son, Dewsbury
Parker, George, Sutton, near Macclesfield, Cheshire, Cotton Spinner. Jan 6. Boote and Edgar, Manchester
Pidrini, Pietro, Bristol, Dealer in Plate. March 1. Brittan and Co, Bristol
Roberts, John, Bury-st, St. James's, Esq. March 31. Webster, Lincoln's-in-fields
Shepherd, James, Landport, Hants, Railway Carrier. Feb 5. Feltham, Portsea
Smethurst, Joseph, Guide Bridge, Lancashire, Engineer. Feb 1. Slater and Poole, Manchester
Stapleton, Henry, Dewsbury, York, Flock Merchant. March 1. Scholefield and Son, Dewsbury
Thornhill, William, Walsall, Staffordshire, Brush Manufacturer. Feb 13. Cotterell, Walsall
Turner, Emma Anne, Newton, Montgomery. Feb 1. Woosnam and Co, Newtown
Verlander, Henry Jacob, Davies-st, Berkeley-sq, Gent. Feb 5. Richards, Warwick-st, Regent-st
Withecomb, Thomas, Lee green, Kent, Gent. Feb 5. Wood, Chatham

TUESDAY, Jan. 9, 1877.

Aberdein, William John, Royal Mint, Gent. March 1. Rhodes and Son, Chancery-lane
Alexander, Joshua, Wimpole-st, Cavendish-sq, Esq. Feb 20. Emanuel and Simmonds, Finsbury-circus
Allpress, Edward Whetham, Eltham, Kent, Esq. March 1. Rhodes and Son, Chancery-lane
Byford, Christopher, Whitwood Mere, York, Butcher. March 21. Bradley and Bradley, Castleford
Cameron, Alexander, Hatfield, York Surgeon. Feb 4. Verity, Doncaster
Collier, William Carr, Lower Broughton, Lancashire, Tin Plate Worker. Feb 14. Atkinson and Co, Manchester
Cook, William, Kingston-upon-Hull, Keel Owner. Feb 23. Laverack, Hull
Davies, Morgan, Newport, Monmouth, Grocer. Feb 26. Gibbs, Newport
Dodd, Mary Elizabeth, Walton-park, nr Liverpool. Feb 15. Wright and Brown, Carlisle
Edwards, William, Lincoln, Gent. April 6. Hebb, Lincoln
Grint, James Myhill, Little Earl-st, Soho, Ironmonger. March 1. Walker and Co, Southampton-st, Bloomsbury
Harris, John, Plumstead, Kent, Gent. Feb 16. Farnfield and Sampson, Queen Victoria st
Harrison, John, Gateshead, Durham, Builder. March 1. Kenmir, Gateshead
Haskell, Sophia, Bournemouth, Hants. March 1. Lacey and Son, Bournemouth
Hough, Major-General Lincoln Stephen, Gloucester-crescent, Hyde park, Bombay Staff Corps. Feb 26. Nicholl and Co, Howard-st, Strand
Jenkins, David, Dallaston, Pembroke, Farmer. Feb 1. Davies and Co Haverfordwest
Kerfoot, Thomas, Cornbrook, near Manchester, Plasterer. March 1. Bagshaw and Wigglesworth, Manchester
Maxwell, Angus, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Feb 16. Wallace, Newcastle-upon-Tyne
Millward, John, Mayfield, Staffordshire, Yeoman. March 1. Holland and Rigby, Ashborne
Moore, Joseph, Pembroke Dock, Pembroke, Chemist. Feb 10. Davies and Co, Haverfordwest
Neele, Josiah, Lampley Stoke, Wiltshire, Esq. Feb 26. Elliott, Verulam buildings, Gray's-inn
Oddy, Ralph, Huddersfield, Yorkshire, Cabinet Maker. April 9. North and Sons, Leeds
Ordish, Noah, Swarkestone, Derby, Farmer. March 1. Sale, Derby
Owen, William, Monachdy, Anglesea, Labourer. Jan 24. Roberts, Bangor
Rastall, William Rickworth, Lincolnshire, Farmer. March 1. Staniland and Wigelsworth, Boston
Riley, Joseph, Manchester, Corn Grinder. March 31. Wood and Atkinson, Manchester
Smith, James, Abram, Lancashire. Feb 10. Wright and Appleton, Wigan
Start, Harley, Stainton, Nottingham, Baker. Feb 16. Heath and Son, Nottingham
Stockdale, John, Liverpool. Feb 6. Thomson and Co, Great James-st, Bedford-row
Strutt, Isaac, Hadleigh, Suffolk, Farmer. Feb 15. Robinson and Co, Hadleigh
Sykes, Richard, Edgeley, Cheshire, Bleacher. May 1. Rushton and Co, Bolton-le-Moors
Thomson, James Wigleworth, Southowram, Halifax, Yorkshire, Gent. March 12. Sutcliffe, Hebden Bridge
Thornton, Richard Napoleon, Portland-place, Esq. Feb 26. Elliott Verulam buildings, Gray's-inn
Townsend, John, Southport, Lancashire, Gent. March 15. Sutcliffe, Hebden Bridge
Twinberrow, James, Suckley, Worcestershire, Farmer. Feb 28. Southall, Worcester
Wilkinson, Joseph, Sheffield, Optic Glass Grinder. Feb 9. Vickers and Son, Sheffield
Williams, Vincent, Swanage, Dorsetshire, Retired Commander R.N. April 5. Jenkins, Falmouth

FRIDAY, Jan. 12, 1877.

Backhouse, Henry, Leeds, Chemist. March 1. Simpson and Burrell, Leeds
Beckwith, Jane Emily, Maidenhead. Feb 21. Rhodes, Church court, Clement's lane
Berry, Richard Bennett, Torquay. Feb 20. Tucker and Son, Ashburton, Devon
Birch, William, Hoo Green, Cheshire, Licensed Victualler. March 3. Addleshaw and Warburton, Manchester
Bremner, Henry, Liverpool, Solicitor. March 1. Bremner and Co, Liverpool
Byford, Christopher, Whitwood Mere, York, Butcher. March 21. Bradley and Bradley, Castleford
Charles, Richard, Haughton, Northumberland, Gent. March 1. Sawbridge, Milk st, Cheapside
Clark, Edward, Weston-super-Mare, Esq. March 20. Prideaux and Clark, Bristol
Clement, Richard, West Peckham, Kent, Farmer. March 1. Stenning, Tonbridge
Colchester, Charles Cornwell, Champion terrace, Denmark hill, Esq. Feb 10. Young and Co, St Mildred's court, Poultry
Croysdill, Henry, Canonbury park south, Accountant. March 1. Travers and Co, Throgmorton st
Dyer, Thomas, Northampton st, Essex rd, Cabinet Manufacturer. March 1. Harcourt and MacArthur, Moorgate st
Gott, James, Kirkby Lonsdale, Westmoreland, Gent. March 15. Sill, Middlesborough-on-Tees
Harris, Juliet Susanna, Lorrimore rd, Walworth. Jan 25. Harris, St James's st, Pall mall
Heathcote, John, Rainow, Cheshire, Farmer. Feb 25. Brocklehurst and Co, Macclesfield
Hulse, Samuel, Minshull Vernon, Cheshire, Grocer. March 25. Cooke, Crewe
Ings, Er, Leigh Common, Somerset, Farmer. Jan 31. Clarkes and Co, Gresham House, Old Broad st
Jackson, Rev George, Oswaldkirk Rectory, York. March 1. Harcourt and MacArthur, Moorgate st
Jones, Charlotte Eliza, Clapham rd. Feb 11. Williams and Co, Lincoln's inn fields
Kenrick, Mary Ann, otherwise Mary Kenderick, Craigycorn Bwlchgwyn, Denbigh. Feb 15. Read, Wrexham
Kirby, William, Sweffling, Suffolk, Farmer. March 5. Welton, Woodbridge
Kirkbank, John, Cumpstones, Cumberland, Gent. Feb 11. Butler, Broughton-in-Furness
Marsh, William, Hackford rd, Brixton, Wine Cooper. Feb 24. Poncione, Raymond buildings, Gray's inn
McCutchan, Ivie, Elm Lodge, Dulwich, Esq. March 1. Sawbridge, Milk st, Cheapside
McNiven, Charles, Perrysfield, Surrey, Esq. March 1. Charlewood and Co, Manchester
Minter, Richard Dunnett, Woodbridge, Suffolk, Hardwareman. Feb 1. Brooke, Woodbridge
Oldham, David, Macclesfield, Cheshire, Gent. March 26. Stephens and Stephens, Essex st, Strand
Oppenheim, Morris Michael, Euston sq, Gent. Feb 10. Wild and Co, Ironmonger lane, Cheapside
Price, William, Kington, Hereford, Gent. Feb 12. Bodenham and Temple, Kington
Prosser, Lucy, Camden grove, Peckham, Surrey. March 1. Harcourt and MacArthur, Moorgate st
Pullen, William, Woking, Farmer. Jan 30. Carritt and Son, Fenchurch st
Robinson, John, Chesterfield, Derby, Watchmaker. Feb 16. Shoesmith, Northampton
Rotton, Anna Maria, Tunbridge Wells. Feb 11. Guscotte and Co, Essex st, Strand
Saunders, William, Albion rd, Dalston. March 1. Wragg, Great St Helen's

Shearley, Rev William James, Burcot House, nr Wells, Somerset. March 1. Kingsford and Co, Essex st, Strand
Stevens, Henry, York, Gent. March 1. Sawbridge, Milk st, Cheapside
Thewles, Maria Elizabeth, Gosport. Feb 19. Leman and Co, Lincoln's inn fields
Wallis, Henry Bell, Mansfield, Nottingham, Cotton Doubler. March 1. Sawbridge, Milk st, Cheapside
Whitty, James, Liverpool, Woollen Draper. April 1. Yates and Co, Liverpool
Willis, Henry, Tue Brook, nr Liverpool, Licensed Victualler. March 1. Bremner and Co, Liverpool
Wilson, Joseph, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Provision Merchant. Feb 8. Watson, Newcastle-upon-Tyne
Wing, Richard, Fordingbridge, Hants, Painter. March 12. Stevens and King, Chancery lane
Wormald, Robert Newnas, Angell rd, Brixton, Gent. March 10. Mossop, Queen Victoria st

Bankrupts.

FRIDAY, Jan. 12, 1877.

Under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869.

Creditors must forward their proofs of debts to the Registrar.

To Surrender in London.

Brunies, Martin, Brook st, Grosvenor sq, Surgeon. Pet Jan 11. Spring-Rice. Jan 31 at 11
Dashwood, Captain Charles Henry, Dover. Pet Jan 8. Brougham. Jan 30 at 11.30
Parnell, William, Gresham buildings, Basinghall st, Auctioneer. Pet Jan 8. Brougham. Jan 23 at 11
Wigg, Edward James, Goose green, Peckham. Pet Jan 8. Brougham. Jan 30 at 11

To Surrender in the Country.

Childs, Thomas, Ham, Surrey, Gent. Pet Jan 8. Bell. Kingston, Feb 1 at 4
Clifford, Montague, and James Green Rogerson, Manchester, Yarn Agents. Pet Jan 10. Kay. Manchester, Jan 29 at 10.30
Croot, Henry, Bristol, Carrier. Pet Jan 9. Harley. Bristol, Jan 23 at 2
Foster, Joseph Pershouse, Moseley, Worcester, Metal Dealer. Pet Jan 8. Cole. Birmingham, Jan 30 at 2.30
Hollidge, William James, and Thomas Smallridge, jun, South Norwood, Builders. Pet Jan 8. Rowland. Croydon, Jan 23 at 2
Kaye, Wilson, Barnsley, Builder. Pet Jan 9. Bury. Barnsley, Jan 26 at 11
Pilson, James, Cambridge, Wine Merchant. Pet Jan 8. Eaden. Cambridge, Jan 25 at 3

TUESDAY, Jan. 16, 1877.

Under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869.

Creditors must forward their proofs of debts to the Registrar.

To Surrender in London.

Borras, Thomas, King st, Cheapside, Brick Agent. Pet Jan 12. Keene. Jan 29 at 11
Selby, Thomas, Museum Hotel, Great Russell st, Gent. Pet Jan 12. Keene. Jan 29 at 12
Williamson, J[illegible], Regent st, Coal Merchant. Pet Jan 12. Keene. Jan 29 at 11.30

To Surrender in the Country.

Barker, William, Liverpool, Printer. Pet Jan 13. Watson. Liverpool, Jan 29 at 1
Bettaney, William, Stoke-upon-Trent, China Manufacturer. Pet Jan 2. Keary. Stoke-upon-Trent, Jan 31 at 11
Corser, George, Manchester, Timber Merchant. Pet Jan 13. Lister. Manchester, Feb 15 at 9.30
Dashwood, Frederick, Bournemouth, Builder. Pet Jan 12. Dickinson. Poole, Jan 29 at 11
Haw, James, Scarborough, Innkeeper. Pet Jan 12. Woodall. Scarborough, Jan 29 at 1
Jenkins, Henry, Stoke-upon-Trent, China Manufacturer. Pet Jan 2. Keary. Stoke-upon-Trent, Jan 31 at 11
Ross, George Clark, Barnes, Surrey, Telegraph Clerk. Pet Jan 9. Willoughby. Wandsworth, Feb 2 at 11

BANKRUPTCIES ANNULLED.

FRIDAY, Jan. 12, 1877.

Harris, Rev H Walpole V[illegible], Llandefailley, Brecon. Jan 9

TUESDAY, Jan. 17, 1877.

Hooper, Howard Joseph, Lewisham, Kent, Salesman. Jan 18

Liquidation by Arrangement.

FIRST MEETINGS OF CREDITORS.

FRIDAY, Jan. 12, 1877.

Atherton, John Gaskin, and Thomas John Henney, Birkenhead, Wine Merchants. Jan 25 at 12 at offices of Sebright and Co, Hamilton st, Birkenhead
Barwell, James, Barking, Essex, Builder. Jan 29 at 11 at offices of Preston, Mark lane
Bedford, Joseph, Sheffield, Iron Merchant. Jan 26 at 1 at the Royal Hotel, Old Haymarket, Sheffield. Greaves and Allen, Sheffield
Benseman, Abraham Levy, Bishopsgate st within, Commission Merchant. Jan 25 at 11 at offices of Ashdown, Gresham st. Lane, Gresham st
Bramhury, Daniel, Manchester, Painter. Jan 24 at 3 at offices of Elliott, King st, Manchester
Brough, Charles, Butterwick, Lincoln, Farmer. Jan 23 at 11 at offices of Wise, Churchyard, Boston
Brown, Henry, West Retford, Nottingham, Cooper. Jan 25 at 11 at offices of Bladon, Gainsborough
Butler, Henry, Great Western terrace, Westbourne park, Builder. Jan 27 at 1 at offices of Copp, Essex st, Strand
Clarke, Henry, Holbeach, Lincoln, Outfitter. Jan 22 at 3 at the Crown Inn, Holbeach. Gaches, Peterborough
Cole, Edwin, Kidderminster, Worcester, Fruiterer. Jan 31 at 3 at offices of Miller and Co, Baxter chambers, Church st, Kidderminster
Cook, George Philip, jun, Hague st, Bethnal green, Builder. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Ponsford, jun, Raymond buildings, Gray's inn
Cottrell, James, Bristol, Saddler. Jan 22 at 11 at offices of Roberts, Clare st, Bristol
Croft, John Lumley, Sunderland, Game Dealer. Jan 25 at 11 at offices of Hall, Villiers st, Sunderland
Cummins, Edward Joseph, Weedington rd, Kentish town, Coffee House Keeper. Jan 22 at 3 at offices of Jordan, Ludgate hill
Ewens, Albert, Vauxhall walk, Lambeth, Contractor. Jan 24 at 12 at offices of Hawkins, Chancery lane
Farrer, John, Tempsford, Bedford, Farmer. Jan 30 at 11 at offices of Mitchell and Webb, St Paul's sq, Bedford
Foster, George, Baddesley Ensor, Warwick, Drag Rakemaker. Jan 23 at 12 at offices of Grove, Atlas chambers, Paradise st, Birmingham
Frater, William John, and John Thomas Ward, Newcastle, Commission Agents. Feb 5 at 3 at offices of Daglish, Sandhill, Newcastle-upon-Tyne
Gooch, Robert Stephen, Belvedere, Kent, Builder. Jan 30 at 13 at offices of Brown, Westminster chambers, Victoria st. Maynard Clifford's inn
Greenwood, John Thomas, Barton-upon-Humber, Lincoln, Saddler. Jan 25 at 3 at the Peacock Hotel, Boston. Mason, Barton-upon-Humber
Harrington, William, Hanley, Engineer. Jan 27 at 11 at the Copeland Arms Inn, Stoke-upon-Trent. Shires, Leicester
Hart, Louis Napoleon, Leeds, Tobacconist. Jan 24 at 4 at offices of Tempest and Hewson, Albion st, Leeds. Singleton, Bradford
Hartley, William, Beestonhirst, Halifax, Brickmaker. Jan 25 at 11 at 13, Ward's end, Halifax. Holroyde and Smith
Hill, William, Long Eaton, Derby, Colliery Agent. Jan 29 at 12 at offices of Acton, Victoria st, Nottingham
Hobson, John Tisseman, Scarborough, Coach Builder. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Watts, Queen st, Scarborough
Hodkin, Henzer, Worksop, Nottingham, Plasterer. Jan 26 at 11 at offices of Esam, George st, Sheffield
Hornsby, Thomas, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Shoemaker. Jan 24 at 3 at offices of Stanford, Collingwood st, Newcastle-upon-Tyne
Howell, William, Queen's rd, Dalston, Journeyman Cheesemonger. Jan 31 at 3 at offices of Fenton, Fo th rd, Highgate
Hudson, William, Bacon st, Bethnal green, Beer Retailer. Jan 24 at 2 at offices of Morris, Paternoster row
Hulme, Joseph Titus, West Gorton, Lancashire, Painter. Jan 31 at 3 at offices of Storer, Fountain st, Manchester
Jackson, William, Normanby, York, Aerated Water Manufacturer. Jan 23 at 11 at offices of Gibson, Commercial buildings, Middlesborough. Spry
Jennings, Jesse, Canterbury, Butcher. Jan 26 at 1 at the Falstaff Hotel, Westgate without, Canterbury. Moss, Gracechurch st
Jones, Hugh, Garthgynan, Denbigh, Farmer. Jan 31 at 11 at the Castle Hotel, Ruthin. Louis and Edwards, Ruthin
Jones, Richard Evan, Ton, Ystradyfodwg, Glamorgan, Licensed Victualler. Jan 25 at 2 at offices of Hollier and Williams, Church st Pontypridd
Keenan, Patrick, Bishop Auckland, Durham, Furniture Dealer. Jan 26 at 2 at offices of Patrick, jun, Fore Bondgate, Bishop Auckland
Kobeisky, Solomon Abraham, Manchester, Shopkeeper. Jan 25 at 11 at offices of Phillips, Pall mall, Manchester
Laister, Walter Edward, Sheffield, Iron Merchant. Jan 26 at 11 at the Royal Hotel, Old Haymarket, Sheffield. Greaves and Allen, Sheffield
Lake, Richard, Hetton-le-Hole, Durham, General Dealer. Jan 24 at 12 at offices of McAllum, Grainger st west, Newcastle-on-Tyne. Salkeld, Durham
Lewis, William, Llanelly, Carmarthen, Tea Dealer. Jan 25 at 11 at offices of Howell, Stepney st, Llanelly
Lloyd, George, Goodrich, Hereford, Butcher. Jan 30 at 3 at the George Hotel, Ross. Jackson, Stroud
Long, James, Dewsbury, York, Grocer. Jan 24 at 3 at offices of Ibberson, Dewsbury
Lyndon, Mark William, Mayall rd, Mercantile Clerk. Jan 27 at 2.30 at offices of Dixon and Co, Bedford row
Magee, William, Lodway, Somerset, Builder. Jan 24 at 3 at offices of Tricks and Co, City chambers, Nicholas st, Bristol. Clifton, Bristol
Manns, George, Tilton rd, Camden grove, Peckham, no occupation, Jan 25 at 12 at 59, Kennington rd, Lambeth. Pearman
McGregor, John, Leeds, Travelling Draper. Jan 23 at 12 at offices of Terry and Robinson, Market st, Bradford
Morgan, William, Llanelly, Rope Manufacturer. Jan 26 at 12 at offices of Hare, Exchange, Bristol. Rees, Llanelly
Mosley, George William, Stalybridge, Lancashire, Grocer. Jan 25 at 3 at the Commercial Inn, Melbourne st, Stalybridge. Buckley and Miller, Stalybridge
Neal, Joseph James, Bracknell, Berks, Grocer. Jan 30 at 1 at the George Hotel, Reading. Cave, Bracknell
Padfield, John, Bristol, Carpenter. Jan 27 at 11 at offices of Wigens, Nicholas st, Bristol. Sherrard, Bristol
Plowman, Gregory Austin, and Frederick Plowman, Skirbeck Quarter, nr Boston, Lincoln, Builders. Jan 25 at 1 at the Red Lion Hotel, Boston. Bailes, Boston
Price, Benjamin, Neath, Glamorgan, Licensed Victualler. Jan 24 at 12 at offices of Leyson, James st, Neath
Rawsthorne, William, and William Fielden, Bolton, Brick Manufacturer. Jan 25 at 11 at offices of Morris, Town Hall chambers, Chorley Road, Thomas George, King's Lynn, Norfolk, Coach Builder. Jan 24 at 12 at offices of Nurse, St James st, King's Lynn
Rees, David, Neath, Glamorgan, Bookseller. Jan 25 at 3 at offices of Charles, Parade, Neath
Ricketts, William Henry, Dewsbury, York, Provision Dealer. Jan 26 at 2.30 at offices of Stapleton, Union st, Dewsbury
Riley, Dorothy, and Reuben Riley, Billington, Lancashire, Bobbin Manufacturers. Jan 26 at 11 at the White Bull Hotel, Church st, Blackburn. Eastham, Clitheroe
Ross, Henry, Manchester, Operative Chemist. Jan 24 at 3 at offices of Whitaker, Chancery lane, Pall Mall, Manchester. Watson, Leeds

Beale, John, Tonbridge, Kent, Builder. Jan 24 at 11 at the Guildhall Coffee House, Guildhall yard. Stenning, Tonbridge

Bingley, Thomas Foster. Donnington-upon-Bain, Lincoln, Farmer. Jan 26 at 2 at offices of Hyde, jun, Upgate, Louth

Bousfield, Robert Dudley, Saddlers' Hall court, Cheapside, Merchant. Jan 26 at 12 at offices of Plunkett, Gutter lane

Solomons, Simon, Crown st, Soho, Clothier. Jan 19 at 11 at offices of Willis, St Mary's court, Leicester

Southworth, Robert, Liverpool, General Dealer. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Parkinson, Commerce court, Lord rd, Liverpool

Spry, Samuel, and Frederick Spry, Charing cross, India Rubber Manufacturers. Jan 25 at 12 at offices of Plunkett, Gutter lane

Stevens, James Francis, Upper Ground st, Blackfriars, Wharfinger Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Eddin, Coleman st. Horwood, Coleman st

Swanston, John, Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk, Clothing Manufacturer. Jan 22 at 1 at offices of Morley and Sherriff, Palmerston buildings, Old Broad st. Pollard, Ipswich

Symons, Andrew, and William Symons, Southwark bridge rd, Engineers. Jan 24 at 3 at 111, Cheapside. Ashurst and Co, Old Jewry

Thomas, Henry, Abergavenny, Monmouth, Mason. Jan 29 at 10.30 at offices of Sayce, Lion st, Abergavenny

Tomes, Henry John, Edgbaston, Birmingham, Grocer. Jan 22 at 3 at offices of Duke, Temple row, Birmingham

Tompkins, Charles Ault, Toddington, Bedford, Baker. Jan 23 at 11.30 at the Bell Inn, Toddington. Scargill, Luton

Torrington, Charles, Bristol, Boiler Maker. Jan 20 at 11 at offices of Essery, Guildhall, Broad st, Bristol

Vardy, James, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Boarding House Keeper. Jan 25 at 3 at offices of Stanford, Collingwood st, Newcastle-upon-Tyne

Walkington, George, Dewsbury, York, Grocer. Jan 31 at 2 at offices of Clay, Union st, Dewsbury. Watts and Son, Dewsbury

Wall, Frederick Isaac, Cardiff, Tobacconist. Jan 29 at 11 at offices of Morgan and Scott, High st, Cardiff

Warren, Daniel, Dunstable, Bedford, Straw Dealer. Jan 25 at 1 at the Ship Inn, Leighton Buzzard. Scargill, Luton

Watson, Henry, Armley, nr Leeds, Builder. Jan 25 at 3 offices of at offices of Granger, Bank st, Leeds

Webb, Thomas, Craven park, Stamford hill, Ship Owners. Jan 24 at 2 at offices of Addleshaw and Warburton, King st, Manchester

West, Joseph James, Mare st, Hackney, Butcher. Jan 20 at 10 at offices of Hicks, Grove rd, Victoria park

Wharton, Robert, South Eston, York, Grocer. Jan 23 at 11 at offices of Taylor, Dovecot st, Stockton-on-Tees

Whitaker, John Henry, Euxton, Lancashire, Salesman. Jan 29 at 2 at offices of Cunliffe and Co, Brown st. Manchester

White, Thomas Alfred, Sheerness, Kent, Draper. Jan 25 at 10.15 at offices of Hicks and Co, Globe rd, Mile End

Whitehead, William, Helpston, Northampton, Brewer. Jan 24 at 11 at offices of Deacon and Wilkins, Cross st, Peterborough

Willett, George, Hastings, Sussex, Builder. Jan 24 at 11 at the Bridge House Hotel, London bridge. Langham and Son, Hastings

Williams, George, Heaton Norris, Lancashire, Tailor. Jan 25 at 3 at offices of Brown and Ainsworth, St Peter's gate, Stockport

Woodger, Henry, Monkwearmouth Shore, Durham, Fish Curer. Jan 24 at 3 at the Royal Hotel, Bridge st, Monkwearmouth Shore. Hick, Scarborough

TUESDAY, Jan. 16, 1877.

Acome, George, Church st, Stoke Newington, Furrier. Jan 31 at 3 at 27, Bedford row

Allport, Henry, Oldswinford, Worcester, Boot Manufacturer. Jan 29 at 11 at offices of Collis, Market st, Stourbridge

Amies, Nathaniel Jones, Manchester, Braid Manufacturer. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Gould, St Peter's gate, Manchester

Ashmore, John, Alsager, Cheshire, Gent. Jan 31 at 3 at the Alsager Arms Inn, Alsager. Cooper, Congleton

Barnes, George, Newcastle-under-Lyme, Grocer. Jan 25 at 11 at offices of Tennant, Cheapside, Hanley

Basford, Joseph, Nantwich, Cheshire, Provision Dealer. Jan 30 at 2, at offices of Lisle, Nantwich

Bate, Urban, Bilston, Stafford, no occupation. Jan 29 at 11 at offices of Bowen, Mount Pleasant, Bilston

Bateman, William, Chesterfield, Derby, Clog Dealer. Jan 27 at 3 at offices of Gee, High st, Chesterfield

Bayley, Frederick, Margate, Builder. Feb 5 at 3 at offices of Robinson Market place, Margate

Begg, David, Durham, Travelling Draper. Jan 30 at 11 at offices of Tilley, Norfolk st, Sunderland

Bethell, Charles, Sale, Cheshire, Landscape Gardener. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Rylance and Barker, Essex st, Manchester

Bloomer, John, Birmingnam, Grocer. Jan 29 at 10.15 at offices of East, Eldon chambers, Cherry st, Birmingham

Boland, William, Birmingham, Gilt Jeweller. Jan 25 at 12 at offices of Southall and Co, Newhall st, Birmingham

Bradley, Charles Sidney, Hipswell, York, Farmer. Feb 6 at 12 at offices of Hunton, Richmond

Bricknell, Robert, and Samuel Topp, Reading, Boot Manufacturers. Feb 5 at 12 at offices of Barnard and Co, Burlington chambers, New st, Birmingham. Southall and Co, Birmingham

Brown, Samuel, Hucknall Torkard, Nottingham, Miner. Feb 2 at 12 at offices of Fraser, Wheelergate, Nottingham

Buck, Thomas, Lansdowne rd, Clapham rd, Solicitor's Clerk. Jan 27 at 1 at 7, Wilmington sq. Lewis

Bullen, Thomas, Bloxwich, Stafford, Charter Master. Jan 30 at 11 at offices of Glover, Park st, Walsall

Calverley, Thomas, Governor of Oxford Castle. Feb 2 at 11 at offices of Swearse, Corn Market st, Hereford

Clarke, Robert, Ware, Hertford, Farmer. Feb 1 at 12 at the Salisbury Arms Hotel, Hertford. Gisby and Son

Codrington, Joseph John, Ponsonby terrace, Vauxhall bridge rd, Plumber. Jan 23 at 4 at the Rochester Arms, Rochester row, Westminster. Gregory, Barbican

Crowshaw, Robert, Ramsbottom, nr Manchester, Joiner. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Grundy and Co, Union st, Bury

Dalton, William, Sheffield, Table Knife Manufacturer. Jan 29 at 12 at offices of Auty and Son, Queen st, Sheffield

Davies, Thomas, St Mary Axe, Cowkeeper. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Cooper and Craigs, Cheapside. Haigh, jun, King st, Cheapside

Dawson, Robert, Langley park, Durham, Grocer. Jan 27 at 3 at offices of Hope, Norfolk st, Sunderland

Durman, Richard Faulkner, Midhurst, Sussex, Smith. Jan 30 at 2 at the Angel Hotel, Midhurst. Albery and Lucas, Midhurst

Fishwick, Samuel, Wigan, Butcher. Feb 1 at 11 at offices of Wilson, King st, Wigan

French, William, Bristol, Boot Salesman. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Tricks and Co, City chambers, Nicholas st, Bristol

Fuller, Charles, Ramsey, Huntingdon, Veterinary Surgeon. Jan 30 at 3 at the George Hotel, Ramsey. Gaches, Peterborough

George, Charles Froggatt, Great Bridge, Tipton, Stafford. Jan 25 at 11 at offices of Stanley, Bridge st, Walsall

Glover, George, and Henry Cooper, Liverpool, Clog Manufacturers. Jan 30 at 3 at offices of Goffey, Lord st, Liverpool

Glover, John, Shelton, Stafford, Grocer. Jan 23 at 3 at 8, Cheapside, Hanley. Ashmall, Hanley

Gough, James, Wolverhampton, Licensed Victualler. Jan 27 at 11 at offices of Stratton and Rudland, Queen st, Wolverhampton

Green, Henry, Neath, Glamorgan, Colliery Proprietor. Feb 1 at 11 at offices of Curtis, Queen st, Neath

Hacking, John, Higher Walton, nr Preston, Lancashire, Beerhouse Keeper. Feb 1 at 2 at offices of Cooper, Chapel st, Preston

Halliwell, Benjamin, and Thomas Scholes Buckley, Oldham, Coal Merchants. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Aston and Sons, Clegg st, Oldham

Harrison, John, and Joseph Charles Lloyd, Birmingham, Lead Merchants. Jan 30 at 12 at offices of Hawkes and Weekes, Temple st, Birmingham

Hartley, Joseph, Manchester, General Warehouseman. Jan 26 at 3 at offices of Addleshaw and Warburton, King st, Manchester

Henley, John, Eastbourne, Grocer. Jan 27 at 11 at the Bear Hotel, Cliffe. Hillman

Henocksberg, Maurice Julius, Upper Charles st, Northampton sq, Islington, Commercial Traveller. Jan 24 at 10 at 23, Leicester sq, Fisher and Co

Hewett, Elizabeth, Bedford. Feb 2 at 12 at offices of Whyley and Piper, Dame Alice st, Bedford

Hodgson, Henry, and William Clapham Hodgson, Woodhouse, nr Leeds, Builders. Jan 26 at 3 at offices of Lodge, Park row, Leeds

Hughes, Hugh, Mold, Flint, Builder. Jan 24 at 12 at offices of Churton, Eastgate buildings, Chester

Hunter, Samuel, Manchester, Hatter. Jan 31 at 3 at offices of McEwen, Lloyd st, Manchester

Jackson, John, Hunslet, Leeds, Butcher. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Brooke, Bond st, Leeds

Janion, John, Runcorn, Cheshire, Ship Carpenter. Jan 29 at 1 at offices of Linaker, Bank chambers, Runcorn

Janion, Thomas, Liverpool, Forwarding Agent. Jan 30 at 2 at offices of Etty, Unity buildings, Lord st, Liverpool

Jones, Eustace, High st, Wandsworth, Agent. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Lay and Scott, George st, Richmond

Kerr, Alexander, Gloucester, Travelling Draper. Jan 24 at 3 at offices of Haines, St John's lane, Gloucester

Laporte, Charles Kroll, Birkdale, Lancashire, Schoolmaster. Jan 30 at 11 at offices of Threlfall, Lord st, Southport

Lee, George, Oulton, York, Joiner. Jan 25 at 3 at offices of Turner, Park sq, Leeds

Lloyd, William Solomon Bowen, Birmingham, Pearl Worker. Jan 31 at 11 at offices of Barber, Colmore row, Birmingham

Love, John, Market place, Kingston-on-Thames, Tailor. Jan 31 at 2 at offices of Wilkinson and Howlett, Bedford st, Covent garden

Maguire, Joseph Collier, Manchester, Window Blind Maker. Jan 31 at 3 at offices of Horner and Son, Clarence st, Manchester

Manning, George, and John Cotterill Dowdney, Cannon st rd, Builders. Jan 29 at 3 at the Guildhall Tavern, Gresham st. James and Son, Leadenhall st

Marland, Thomas, Farnworth, Lancashire, Bricksetter. Jan 24 at 3 at offices of Scowcroft, Town Hall sq, Bolton

Martin, Henry George, Bursiem, Stafford, Grocer. Jan 26 at 11 at offices of Tennant, Cheapside, Hanley

McVey, Hugh, Kirkdale, nr Liverpool, Boot Manufacturer. Jan 29 at at 3 at offices of Lynch and Teebay, Lord st, Liverpool

Meacham, James, Piddington, Northampton, Publican. Jan 26 at 11 at offices of Jeffery, Market sq, Northampton

Milligan, Thomas, Gateshead, Durham, Tailor. Jan 24 at 1 at offices of Wilson, Featherstone chambers, Collingwood st, Newcastle-on-Tyne

Moll, John William, Pomeroy st, Old Kent rd, New Cross, Cutler. Jan 26 at 12 at offices of Montagu, Bucklersbury

Morgan, Richard, Watford, Hertford, Licensed Victualler. Jan 29 at 1 at the Clarendon Hotel, Watford. Hodgson, Salisbury st, Strand

Neil, Philip, South Bank, Regent's park, Gent. Jan 26 at 2 at offices of Grain, Philpot lane

Nobes, John, Stanford-in-the-Vale, Berks, Beerhouse Keeper. Jan 30 at 12 at offices of Jotcham, Wantage

Onions, Isaac, and William Bailey, Ettingshall, Stafford, Coal Masters. Jan 29 at 11 at offices of Stirk, North st, Wolverhampton

Partridge, Frederick John, Gracechurch st, Wine Merchant. Feb 9 at 2 at Lombard House, George yard, Lombard st. Vallance and Vallance, Essex st, Strand

Pell, James, Church st, Twickenham, Oilman. Jan 30 at 2 at offices of Lay and Scott, Great Newport st, St Martin's lane

Potter, Thomas Sydney, Bishopsgate st within, Merchant. Jan 30 at 11 at offices of Foster, Birchin lane

Pratt, John, Beverley, York, Draper. Jan 31 at 3 at offices of Shepherd, Lairgate, Beverley

Prosser, Charles, Blaenavon, Monmouth, Innkeeper. Jan 29 at 12 at offices of Tribe and Co, High st, Newport. Gibbs, Newport

Radge, Joseph, South Shields, Durham, Haberdasher. Jan 27 at 10 at offices of Blair, King st, South Shields

Reed, John Burnicle, Bishopwearmouth, Durham, Builder. Jan 29 at 3.30 at offices of McKenzie, Fawcett st, Sunderland

Richardson, Henry Ferdinand, Fenchurch st, Commission Agent. Jan 31 at 2 at offices of Linklater and Co, Walbrook

Roach, Robert, Aston New Town, nr Birmingham, Baker. Jan 31 at 3 at offices of Buller and Bickley, Bennett's hill, Birmingham

Roberts, John, Rhosygwalia, Merioneth, Blacksmith. Jan 29 at 12 at the Wynnstay Arms, Ruabon. Passingham, Bela
Roper, Joseph, Orrell, Lancashire, Cotton Spinner. Jan 29 at 2 at offices of Wright and Appleton, King st, Wigan
Rumson, John, Ilfracombe, Devon, Grocer. Feb 5 at 1 at the Grand Hotel, Bristol. Finch, Barnstaple
Sanderson, Joseph, Cadeby, York, Farmer. Jan 29 at 2 at offices of Fisher, High st buildings, Doncaster
Sargent, George, Nottingham, out of business. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Belk, Middle pavement, Nottingham
Saurin, William, Swansea, Wine Merchant. Feb 2 at 3 at offices of Tribe and Co, Moorgate st buildings, Moorgate st. Davies and Hartland, Swansea
Scaife, John, Leeds, Beerhouse Keeper. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Pullan, Bank chambers, Park row, Leeds
Scoltock, Samuel, Shrewsbury, Salop, Grocer. Jan 31 at 11 at offices of Clarke, Swan hill, Shrewsbury
Scott, George, Dalton-in-Furness, Lancashire, Brewer. Feb 7 at 2 at the Temperance Hall, Ulverston. Poole, Ulverston
Simon, Camille Marie Eugene, Pier House Laundry, Chiswick, Cleaner. Jan 30 at 12 at offices of Taylor and Jaquet, South st, Finsbury sq
Slater, Samuel, and Benjamin Riley, Darlaston, Stafford, Colonial Works. Jan 26 at 11 at offices of Corbett, Pinfold st, Darlaston
Smethurst, John, Oldham, Lancashire, Colliery Proprietor. Jan 26 at 3 at offices of Sutton and Elliott, Fountain st, Manchester
Smith, Henry, Southport, Lancashire, Builder. Jan 31 at 11 at offices of Threlfall, Lord st, Southport
Smith, Mary Ann, Forton, Lancashire, Grocer. Jan 30 at 2 at offices of Blackhurst, Fox st, Preston
Sparks, Richard, Wilmington sq, Enameller. Jan 23 at 3 at offices of Barnett, New Broad st
Stanwix, Harry, Leeds, Engineer. Jan 29 at 3 at offices of Hewson, East parade, Leeds
Steele, Joseph, Stoke-upon-Trent, Stafford, Blacksmith. Jan 27 at 11 at offices of Tennant, Cheapside, Hanley
Stocks, Joseph Charles, New Basford, Nottingham, Brewer's Clerk. Feb 2 at 4 at offices of Fraser, Wheeler gate, Nottingham
Stokes, John, Altrincham, Cheshire, Chemist. Feb 2 at 11 at offices of Whitt, King st, Manchester
Taylor, Henry, Carlisle, Innkeeper. Jan 30 at 3 at offices of Errington, English st, Carlisle
Taylor, James William, Treorki, Glamorgan, Contractor. Jan 26 at 12 at offices of Thomas, Church st, Pontypridd
Tayler, Robert, Langley park, Durham, Builder. Jan 27 at 4 at offices of Hope, Norfolk st, Sunderland
Thomson, William Armour, Liverpool, Undertaker. Feb 2 at 3 at offices of Lowe, Castle st, Liverpool
Thomas, William Wallace, South Shields, Durham, Innkeeper. Jan 31 at 1 at offices of Dale, King st, South Shields
Thornhill, John Henry, Liverpool, General Dealer. Jan 26 at 2 at offices of Pemberton and Co, Harrington st, Liverpool
Tilston, John, Chester, Merchant. Jan 26 at 2 at offices of Roberts and Dickson, Newgate st, Chester
Vertue, George Julius, Weymouth, Dorset, Corn Merchant. Feb 5 at 11 at the Auction Mart, Market st, Melcombe Regis. Howard, Melcombe Regis
Vile, Elizabeth, Lower Belgrave st, Belgrave sq, Dressmaker. Feb 5 at 1 at offices of Berkeley, Marylebone rd
Warner, Frederick William, Great Dunmow, Essex, Ironmonger. Jan 31 at 12 at the Green Dragon Hotel, Bishopsgate st
Watson, James, Nottingham, Horse Dealer. Jan 30 at 12 at offices of Brittle, St Peter's gate, Nottingham
Welsh, James, Cambria terrace, Cambria rd, Loughborough Junction, out of business. Jan 29 at 2 at offices of Walter and Co, Southampton st, Bloomsbury sq
Whitaker, James, Halifax, York, Outfitter. Jan 29 at 3.30 at offices of Storey, King Cross st, Halifax
Wilkinson, Henry, Accrington, Lancashire, Watchmaker. Jan 26 at 3 at the Derby Hotel, St James st, Accrington. Tattersall, Blackburn
Williams, James, Monmouth, Carpenter. Jan 29 at 2 at offices of Deakin, Castle Hill, Monmouth
Williams, William, Hoole, Cheshire, Traveller. Jan 29 at 2 at the Bee Hotel, Rhyl. Bridgman and Co, Chester
Wilson, Henry, Heyburn terrace, Tottenham, no occupation. Jan 30 at 3 at the Doughty Hall, Bedford row. Lee, Martin's lane, Cannon st